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Current History

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As the age of the ICBM opens, the United States faces areas of unusual tension in many parts of the world. Here seven articles explore the problems faced by American statesmen and citizens today. Perhaps foremost of these problems is the United States-Soviet race for space. As an introductory article evaluates this dilemma, "To restore its prestige, the United States will need a demonstration of its technological superiority as spectacular as that which the Soviet Union achieved by launching its earth satellites." Believing that "military strength is the foundation upon which the edifice of a nation's posture vis à vis other nations must be built," Hans Morgenthau pleads for "the effective, speedy and spectacular restoration of American military strength."

Russian Technology and American Policy

BY HANS J. MORGENTHAU

Director, Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy, University of Chicago

THE problems which the foreign and military policies of the United States must face in 1958 have not been created, but only accentuated and dramatized, by the Russian launching of two earth satellites in October and November, 1957. The United States would but compound past mistakes were it to concentrate its efforts upon competing with the Soviet Union in that field of technology and in the process lose sight of the unsolved problems of its foreign and military policy, which both antedate in time, and transcend in importance, the Russian launching of earth satellites. Those launchings were a dramatic demonstration of the decline of American power, a decline which started in September, 1949, and proceeded at an ever accelerated speed, unbeknown to ourselves but not to our friends and enemies.

The Russian explosion of an atomic bomb in September, 1949, was the first great turning point in the post-war history of American foreign policy. It signified the beginning

of the end of the atomic monopoly and, with it, of the military supremacy of the United States. This Russian achievement made it obvious that it would only be a matter of a few years until the Soviet Union would match the United States in the ability to destroy its enemies with atomic weapons. In other words, the event of September, 1949, ushered in the period of the atomic stalemate, in which we are still living today.

October and November, 1957, have the same significance for the period of the atomic stalemate as September, 1949, had for the period of American supremacy. They foreshadow its termination and threaten to usher in the age of Russian military supremacy. For the ability of the Soviet Union to launch a satellite weighing more than a thousand pounds demonstrates that the Soviet Union possesses rockets usable for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's) far surpassing in power the most powerful rockets at present at the disposal of the United States.

In consequence, if one assumes the con-

continuation of this present imbalance of technological potential, the Soviet Union will have operational ICBM's long before the United States will have them. How far the United States has fallen behind the Soviet Union in this respect is impossible for the outsider to say. Official estimates range all the way from a few months to five years, given the continuation of the present rate of progress in both countries. During this interval, the Soviet Union would have the monopoly of being able to destroy any target in the United States with a delivery system which is now and in all likelihood will still then be immune to interception. Here, however, the analogy between September, 1949, and October-November, 1957, ends.

Atomic Parity

In September, 1949, the Russian ability to achieve atomic parity with the United States was a foregone conclusion. The United States could console itself with the thought that it would always have more atomic bombs than the Soviet Union. It could increase its retaliatory power by developing its strategic air force and its bases. It could at the same time try to minimize the consequences of a Russian attack by the dispersal of targets and civilian defense. What it could not even try to do was to reverse the course of history and deny the Soviet Union that atomic parity which the explosion of an atomic bomb in September, 1949, had put in its grasp.

In contrast to the fatality which marked the development ushered in in September, 1949, the developments foreshadowed by the events of October-November, 1957, constitute a threat which the United States is able to meet, if for no other reason than it must meet it for the sake of its very survival. There is nothing fatal about the threat of Russian atomic superiority as there was something fatal about the threat of Russian atomic parity in September, 1949. The actual achievement of that superiority for any militarily relevant length of time is certain only on the assumption, made above, that the present imbalance of technological potential between the Soviet Union and the United States continues. It might indeed

continue or even increase, provided the government and the people of the United States do not take the drastic measures necessary to restore the balance. Yet there is no objective reason why such measures cannot be taken.

The danger that confronts the United States consists in the virtual certainty that the Soviet Union will have an operational ICBM before the United States has it. In order to meet that danger the military policy of the United States must perform two tasks: it must shorten this time lag between the United States and the Soviet Union to a minimum, and it must maintain the defensive and retaliatory power of the United States during this time lag. To this task must be added a third one: the restoration of the balance between the retaliatory power of the United States and its conventional forces capable of fighting and winning local wars.

Military Imbalance

The urgency of that restoration was not created, but was only accentuated, by the threatened increase in the military power of the Soviet Union. During the whole period of the atomic stalemate, the United States put its main strategic emphasis upon its retaliatory atomic power, consistently neglecting and reducing its conventional forces, while the Soviet Union maintained the quantitative superiority, and achieved the qualitative superiority, especially in terms of weapons, of these forces. In consequence, the United States has been faced with the self-created dilemma of being unable to fight successfully a local war with conventional forces and of being unwilling to commit its all-out retaliatory power to such a local issue.

Thus the United States deprived itself of the ability to defend local interests effectively and at tolerable risks; in the face of local attack upon its interests, it could only abstain or retreat. The Soviet threat to surpass the United States in the capability to fight an all-out atomic war has greatly increased the need for an American capability to fight local wars with conventional forces and without resort to all-out atomic weapons.

The first of these three tasks could best be performed by a crash program which would bend the total resources of the nation toward achieving an operational ICBM at the earliest possible moment. However, this solution, taken by itself, may not solve the military problem of the United States at all; for it may call forth two dangers, in their ways as serious as the danger which it is intended to counter. On the one hand, the United States is not likely, in view of the Russian head start, to close the technological gap before the Soviet Union has the operational ICBM. The United States will then be exposed to the Russian ICBM without being able to retaliate in kind; for its sole weapon of retaliation will then be that fraction of the Strategic Air Force which happens to be in the air at the moment of attack with sufficient fuel to reach its targets.

On the other hand, the concentration of the national effort upon a crash program would, at best, shift the resources now committed to the retaliatory power of the United States to the ICBM, leaving the local defenses of the United States as denuded as they are today. At worst, a considerable portion of the insufficient resources now committed to these local defenses might be deflected to the crash program, thus increasing the imbalance between retaliatory and local forces which has paralyzed the foreign policy of the United States and threatened its security even before the first Russian satellite appeared in the sky. That danger would be enormously increased by the Russian ability to mount a local attack backed by the ICBM without having to fear American retaliation in kind.

Triple Task

The triple task which confronts the United States, then, requires a balanced military program, of which the accelerated production of an operational ICBM is bound to be an indispensable part of high priority. Aside from it, this program must meet five requirements: the development of the Strategic Air Force and of the intermediate ballistic missile (IRBM), dispersal of military and civilian targets and the development of civilian defense, the restoration of conven-

tional forces. The first two of these requirements serve to maintain and strengthen the retaliatory power of the United States; two aim to strengthen its defensive posture; the last seeks to restore the balance between strategic and conventional forces. That such a comprehensive military program will tax the resources of the United States no one will doubt. However, to doubt that speedy and effective execution of such a program is beyond the resources of the United States is tantamount to doubting that the United States is capable of maintaining or restoring military parity with the Soviet Union, that is, of surviving as a great power and of surviving at all.

As long as this issue remains in doubt the position of the United States *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union, the uncommitted nations and its allies remains in jeopardy.

Soviet Military Advantage

The prospective decline of American military power, however temporary, is likely to affect the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in a dual way. While one can dismiss, in view of the incalculable risks for itself, the possibility that the Soviet Union might use its temporary military advantage to unleash an all-out attack upon the United States, one must expect bolder and more aggressive Russian policies on all other levels of international action. The American policy in the fall of 1956 on the occasion of the Hungarian revolution and of the invasion of Egypt showed the Soviet Union that it need have no fear of forceful American action which might threaten to transform a local conflict into a world-wide one. Its present military advantage cannot but reinforce that assurance.

Thus the Soviet Union is likely to press with greater vigor than ever before whatever local advantage seems to offer itself for diplomatic, military, or propagandistic action. Beyond this, the Soviet Union will not pass by the opportunity of using its technological achievements as a weapon in a world-wide political and propagandistic offensive.

These advantages which the Soviet Union can expect to gain from the shift in the

distribution of military power decrease the chances for a negotiated settlement between the United States and the Soviet Union on terms acceptable to the United States. The principle that a nation must negotiate only from strength, which the United States in the past embraced at least in theory, the Soviet Union now is in a position to turn against the United States. It can express its willingness to negotiate on terms which reflect the new distribution of military power and which, hence, are more favorable to itself than those on which it might have negotiated in the past. By the very same token, the United States can hardly afford to negotiate in earnest with the Soviet Union before it has demonstrated the temporary character of the threatening imbalance of military power through a massive effort to put its military house in order.

Prestige and Psychology

As the new distribution of military power complicates the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and works to the detriment of the former, so it does with regard to the relations between the United States and the uncommitted nations. Its effects have thus far been primarily psychological; the prestige of the Soviet Union is increased and that of the United States is diminished. In the struggle for the minds of men, waged by the United States and the Soviet Union among the uncommitted nations, the relative prestige of the two contenders has naturally been the main issue. Who is likely to win a local or all-out war? Who is better equipped to increase the power and economic well-being of under-developed nations through technical and economic aid? Whose political system is more likely to cope with the problems facing the uncommitted nations? The answers to questions such as these determine the prestige of the two contenders.

The prestige which the United States has enjoyed among the uncommitted nations derives primarily not from the qualities of political freedom and equality of opportunity, which the United States itself cherishes above all others, but rather from its standard of living and its technological achievements

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which, in contrast to those other qualities, are visible, tangible, demonstrable and seemingly attainable by all through imitation.

The demonstration of American technological inferiority has greatly diminished the prestige of the United States among the uncommitted nations, since that prestige was in good measure built upon the assumption of American technological superiority. And in the measure that American prestige has fallen the prestige of the Soviet Union, by virtue of its accomplishments in one spectacular field of technology, has risen. Since the uncommitted nations have long been torn between admiration and resentment of American wealth and technology, it is only natural for them to avail themselves of this opportunity of doubting the superiority of the United States in all compartments of technology, having found the United States wanting in one.

To restore its prestige, the United States will need a demonstration of its technological superiority as spectacular as that which the Soviet Union achieved by launching its earth satellites. As long as such a success is wanting, the United States will be greatly handicapped in its competition with the Soviet Union among the uncommitted nations of the world. Only if it is able to prove to the uncommitted nations that it is at the very least a match for the Soviet Union in the most spectacular compartments of technology will the United States be able to take the wind out of the sails of the political offensive upon which the Soviet Union has embarked through the instruments of propaganda and economic and technological aid.

The Atlantic Alliance

Nowhere does the impact of Russian technological achievements present itself so clearly as an acceleration and accentuation of past trends as in the relations between the United States and its allies. The crisis of the Atlantic Alliance, now on everybody's lips, antedates the fall of 1957 by several years. It is the result of political, military and economic conditions radically different from those which gave birth to the alliance in the late 1940's.

During that first period, the Atlantic Alliance was sustained by four factors: the atomic monopoly of the United States, the economic weakness of the nations of Western Europe, the intransigence of Stalinist policies and the American need of European bases. None of these factors has survived the developments of recent years unchanged: some have been weakened, others strengthened, and still others, such as the economic weakness of Western Europe, have disappeared altogether.

The atomic monopoly of the United States provided the nations of Western Europe with absolute protection against Russian conquest. Once the Soviet Union achieved atomic parity with the United States, the Atlantic Alliance was for the nations of Western Europe no longer solely a protection but also a liability. For the atomic stalemate threatens not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but also their allies, with total destruction. This threat to the nations of Western Europe, inherent in the atomic stalemate, has been aggravated by recent Russian advances in missile technology.

While the atomic stalemate implies the American ability to retaliate against the Russian threat in kind, thereby protecting the United States and the nations of Western Europe, Russian advances in missile technology threaten to put into jeopardy this American ability of retaliation in kind and thereby to expose the nations of Western Europe to total destruction by Russian IRBM's. Thus the nations of Western Europe cannot help asking themselves whether if there is a chance for them to survive in the atomic age it may lie in not being too closely identified, or perhaps not being identified at all, with the United States.

"Latent Neutralism"

This latent neutralism has had a corrosive influence upon the allies. Its influence has been the more persistent as it has been primarily the result not of propaganda or other subjective factors, but of the new objective conditions under which the nations of Western Europe must live in the age of

the atomic stalemate and of threatening Russian superiority.

These objective conditions have also affected the American position and interest in the Atlantic Alliance. As long as the chief deterrent to the Soviet Union remained the atomic bomb delivered by planes, the availability of bases on the territory of the European members of the Atlantic Alliance was for the United States extremely important but probably not absolutely vital. Once the ICBM has replaced airplanes as means of delivering the atomic bomb, the availability of such bases will be of only minor interest to the United States.

In the meantime, the Russian technological advances, threatening superiority in the delivery of weapons of mass destruction, have temporarily increased the importance of European bases for the United States. For during that intermediate period when the United States will be threatened by Russian ICBM's without being able to retaliate in kind, the United States must rely for retaliation upon the Strategic Air Command and IRBM's launched from surface ships, submarines and overseas bases. Thus the United States finds itself in the uncomfortable position of having temporarily a vital interest in overseas bases while its allies who are asked to provide those bases have a greatly diminished interest in providing such facilities.

Soviet Foreign Policy

The Soviet Union has not been slow in using these new military conditions, stemming from its actual achievement of atomic parity and threatening achievement of atomic superiority, for the purpose of weakening and ultimately destroying the Atlantic Alliance. What has been called the "new look" of Soviet foreign policy is essentially a new flexibility which has taken the place of the monotony of the Stalinist threats. In the face of these threats, no nation which wanted to survive as a nation had any choice; thus Stalin was really the architect of the Western Alliance. The new Soviet foreign policy alternately threatens and tempts, as the occasion seems to require, but always

seeks to hold before the eyes of Western Europe an acceptable or even preferable alternative to the Atlantic Alliance.

Conclusion

As this deterioration—actual and potential—of the American position in the world stems from the deterioration—actual and potential—of the military strength of the United States *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union, so the cure must be commensurate with the disease. It lies in the effective, speedy and spectacular restoration of American military strength. It is true that that restoration can be no substitute for the rethinking and reform of American foreign policy, economic aid and psychological warfare, much too long neglected. But it is the indispensable precondition for them. For military strength is the foundation upon which the edifice of a nation's posture *vis-à-vis* other nations must be built.

With that foundation weak and crumbling, everything else is bound to be weak and crumbling. The United States, in its present predicament, would make a fatal mistake if it were led to believe, as it has been to its regret in the past, that since the uses of military power are limited the other instruments of a nation's foreign policy can serve as a substitute for it. It is an elemental truth of all foreign policy that as there is no substitute for the other instruments of foreign policy, there is no substitute for military strength.

Hans J. Morgenthau was born and educated in Germany. He has taught in many universities in the United States and Europe. During 1956-1957, he was Visiting Professor of Political Science at Yale and Columbia Universities. His latest books include Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Politics Among Nations, and In Defense of the National Interest. Mr. Morgenthau has also served as consultant to the Department of State.

"... The West has suffered a major defeat in the Middle East," writes this specialist. He calls for a revision of the American policy of military pacts and alliances: "as an instrument of policy, such pacts and alliances have been at once too blunt and too heavy, inefficient yet irritating. . . ." What is "the truly formidable task confronting American diplomacy in the Middle East"?

United States Policy and the Arabs

BY CHARLES ISSAWI

Associate Professor of Near and Middle East Economics, Columbia University

AT THE end of the Second World War, the United States was undoubtedly the most popular Great Power in the Arab countries. American educators and businessmen had created a great fund of good will for this country, Arabs had had no political conflicts with the United States, and the prevailing picture of America was that of the great champion of oppressed peoples.

Today, it is safe to say that the United States is very much disliked. The chorus of praise with which the Sputniks have been greeted in the Arab countries was not motivated by pure love of science or rejoicing over man's conquest of space; rather it was an expression of delight that the United States had lost a round in the struggle with its enemy.

This fact is not, in itself, overwhelming. The United States cannot, and should not try to win popularity contests and, anyway, Great Powers are seldom liked by those who feel the impact of their policy. But the change is sufficiently disturbing to warrant an examination of the forces that

brought it about. Those forces can be divided into two broad groups. The first consists of those which almost inevitably arise from the mere fact that the United States has achieved world leadership and from the nature of its economic and political structure; the second set of forces is the direct consequence of United States actions and policies in the Middle East.

To the first group belongs a factor that transcends the Middle East and is equally widespread in Asia, Europe and Latin America. Rich relatives are seldom liked, even if they use their wealth and power with exemplary tact, (and they seldom do so) and United States policy is liable to be misunderstood and distorted. In 1954, a highly educated Egyptian argued very forcefully with this writer that United States support of land reform in Egypt—which all serious students of the country have advocated and which the Nasser government has been carrying out—was designed to impede its industrial and economic progress. At the same time, most Arabs were accusing the United States of supporting landlords and other reactionary groups in the Arab countries. Americans must learn to accept that sort of reaction, especially in the Middle East.

A second factor has been the widespread picture of the United States as a monopolistic capitalist, out to open new markets by suppressing local industries and to use up its unsaleable surpluses by provoking an armament race and local or even global wars. Many Middle Easterners and others, as respectably bourgeois as M. Jourdain, fluently speak this Marxist prose without realizing it.

Charles Issawi was born in Cairo, Egypt, and educated at Oxford University, England. He served in the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank of Egypt in Cairo from 1937 to 1943, and with the Middle Eastern division of the United Nations Department of Economic Affairs from 1948 to 1955. Author of *Egypt at Mid-century*, Mr. Issawi has also taught at the American University in Beirut.

This article was prepared in December, 1957

The third factor is more specific. The United States is identified with Europe and is therefore debited with all the liabilities accumulated by European imperialism in the Arab world. This may seem to Americans to be grossly unfair. After all, the United States—together with Britain—put great pressure on France to grant Syria and Lebanon their independence; it has put further pressure on the French in North Africa; it greatly helped the Egyptians to obtain favorable terms from the British in 1954; lastly, and most important, it stood against its two principal allies in the Suez crisis of 1956.

Yet, basically, the Arab instinct has been sound in this matter. Western Europe and the United States are one, and can only survive together, and hence ultimately their policies are usually harmonized. One of the great misfortunes of our times is that, in this matter, Americans are less perceptive, and realize this identity of interests only in emergencies.

A fourth factor is economic. The fact that the United States is an exporter of agricultural produce, in this case, of cotton (which is the main export staple of both Egypt and Syria) and of wheat and rice (the second most important export items of Syria and Egypt respectively) has not made relations with those two countries easier. Like other primary producers, they took it for granted when the United States indirectly helped them by supporting its crops and raising world prices and resented the fact that the United States later sought to dispose of the surpluses it had thus accumulated, even though great pains were usually taken not to disrupt world markets in the process.

Finally, certain United States attitudes towards the rest of the world, and particularly the underdeveloped countries, have done much to counteract the beneficial effect of the massive economic and political aid given to them. Too often responsible United States officials have talked as though their only interest in other countries was to use them as pawns in the game being played against Russia. Seldom have these countries been regarded as ends, not means; seldom has it been said that aid should be given

because it would help to relieve the deep misery of millions of their inhabitants; and seldom has help been given without conditions which many of them regard as galling or unacceptable. By contrast the Soviet Union, whose obvious aim is to dominate and enslave those peoples, has managed to persuade them that the aid it offers is given without strings and is such they can accept without jeopardizing their political integrity and freedom.

These factors would, by themselves, have constituted a severe but not crippling handicap to United States policy in the Middle East. To account for the present antagonism two further factors, deriving directly from United States actions in the region, must be considered: support of Israel and recent policy towards the Arabs.

Israel and the Arabs

Arabs maintain that, of all the Great Powers, the United States did most to bring Israel into being and to support it morally and financially. Now the consequences to the Arabs of the creation of Israel can be simply stated: the loss of a country to which they were strongly attached, the displacement of over three quarters of a million of homeless refugees, and the impoverishment of perhaps another quarter of a million by loss of land or other means of livelihood.

Moreover, Arabs have always maintained that Israel constituted a great military danger, and the Israeli campaign in Sinai in 1956 showed that this fear was not imaginary. Finally, their defeat at the hands of Israel constituted a very humiliating experience for the Arabs. It is not, therefore, surprising that an intense hatred of Israel is widespread in all sections of Arab society.

And yet this simple, causal relation seems to be beyond the comprehension of most Western observers, who have shown considerable ingenuity in formulating alternative explanations. Thus, as recently as November 17, 1957, a *New York Times* editorial could say: "The Arab objection [to Israel] is kept venomous by feudal or semi-feudal rulers and ruling groups whose real opposition is to the democratic and economic features of Israel." The truth is that those unhappy

rulers and groups, seeing doom staring them in the face, are of all Arabs the ones most ready to put up with Israel!

But it is not only over Israel that the United States has irritated the Arabs. For the last dozen years the American press has indulged in an unrestrained campaign of vilifications of the Arabs, which—since not all of them are illiterate—has hardly endeared this country to them. It is fair to say that none of the world's many underdeveloped peoples have received as little sympathy and understanding of their very complex problems—or as much abuse and criticism for their shortcomings—as have the Arabs.¹

Then came a series of Anglo-American diplomatic blunders: the Baghdad Pact, which performed the seemingly impossible miracle of simultaneously angering Egypt, Syria, India, Israel and France; the attempt to press Jordan to join that Pact, with the many nefarious consequences flowing from it; the failure to meet Abdel Nasser's request for arms, which made him turn to the Soviet Union; and lastly, and most unfortunate, the hurried offer of aid for the Aswan Dam followed by a still more hurried withdrawal in circumstances designed to cause Abdel Nasser the maximum of embarrassment and humiliation. This action was described at the time as a "calculated risk": one can only shudder at the kind of calculus used.

As against this, the Soviet Union played its cards with great skill. Of course, its task was much easier. It was outside the region, the Western Powers were inside, and in politics "*les présents ont toujours tort.*" It had no stake in the area and could lose nothing and might possibly win by upsetting the applecart. Its one concern was to prevent the formation of a solid Middle East bulwark blocking Soviet expansion, a real possibility in the immediate postwar period.

¹ Of course the West, including the United States, has had considerable provocation from the Arabs. Thus, to mention only one example, there was the campaign of abuse—including inflammatory broadcasts to the Mau Mau—carried out by Egypt in 1954-1955 immediately after it had achieved, with United States help, its major aim of securing British evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone and while it was soliciting United States aid. But foolish conduct on the part of small countries does not excuse foolish actions by Great Powers. Two wrongs may sometimes make a right, but two acts of petulance can never add up to a reasonable policy.

This it did by giving aid to Israel, including Czech arms in the fateful summer of 1948, and by opposing all American and British attempts to implement the Bernadotte and other compromise plans. Having thus laid a time-bomb which would sooner or later shatter the Middle East structure, the Russians could afford to withdraw, secure in the knowledge that, as Mr. Gromyko told the Arab delegates in the United Nations in 1947, the Arabs would soon realize who were their true friends.

In recent years the Russians began to support the Arabs in the never-failing incidents with Israel and, since 1955, they have used their great economic power as an instrument of political penetration. Their success has been spectacular. The Western monopoly in the Middle East has been broken, and there is no reason to believe that the Russians have yet reached the limit of their expansion.

Of course Soviet policy has been greatly aided by the obtuseness of the Arabs, whose obsession with their grievances—both real and imaginary—has completely blinded them to what has happened in the rest of the world. The invasion of Finland, the deportation of millions of Poles and Balts, the Putsch in Czechoslovakia, the liquidation of the Crimean Tatars and other Muslim peoples, the aggression in Korea and the butchery in Budapest—all this has moved them very little. Nor do they seem aware of the danger to which they are exposing themselves. Frustrated and humiliated, they cosily cuddle against the Russian bear and do not see its claws.

So much for the causes of the present situation. Any recommendation of policy must start from several facts: the West has suffered a major defeat in the Middle East; the monopoly it enjoyed for so long has been shattered beyond repair; Russia has at last achieved its 250-year-old dream of breaking into the region; all the West can hope for is to cut its losses and save its vital interests.

These interests are twofold: to prevent the Middle East from passing under effective Russian domination; and to keep its oil flowing to Europe.

One further general remark must be made.

Whatever its local causes and origins, the Middle East crisis is now of global concern, and its solution must be envisaged in global terms. The first possibility is some kind of agreement with the Soviet Union. This cannot be ruled out of hand for the Soviet Union must be aware of the great dangers to itself of a major crisis in an area so close to its borders. But to believe that the Russians will agree to cooperate in any Middle East settlement which does not form part of a much bigger whole would be to expect behavior unusual in power politics. After all, the Russians have much to gain, and nothing to lose, from sowing discord in the area.

As Lord Curzon said 60 years ago, when discussing a similar situation and a similar proposal regarding Iran: "Russia is interested not in the reform of Persia but in its decay; in the background of her ambitions is the vision of a country and a people falling from inherent debility into her grasp." And yet it is worth bearing in mind that only a few years later Britain and Russia reached an agreement on Iran, partitioning it into spheres of influence.

Failing a general settlement with the Soviet Union, a local solution must be sought without it. This can be done, however, only by revising another of the major concepts of United States policy, that of military pacts and alliances. For as an instrument of diplomacy, such pacts and alliances have been at once too blunt and too heavy, inefficient yet irritating—and this because they have been applied indiscriminately to all the culture areas of the world.

Alliance with Europe along traditional lines is too little; nothing short of a great measure of political and economic integration may be necessary to save the Western world. And integration could be achieved there because the necessary cultural community already exists.

But in Asia, alliances and military pacts do more harm than good; they bind a few countries with fragile threads and prick their neighbors with sharp needles. Asians do not feel any attachment to Western civilization because they do not in fact belong to that civilization; they feel no concern to save Christian, Western values be-

cause they have their own non-Christian, Eastern values and because, only too often, Western values have been used against them; they do not want to get politically entangled with those same Powers from whom they have just disengaged themselves.

Asian neutralism is not just a manifestation of perversity; it is the only course one could reasonably expect Asia to pursue. The only hope for the West is that "uncommitted" Asia will remain truly neutral, i.e., that it will keep out the Russians and Chinese as well as the Americans, British and French. Western policy should aim first at convincing Asians that all it wants from them is genuine neutrality; secondly at offering them help—economic and technical but also political and moral—in achieving that neutrality; and thirdly at making it clear that it is not trying to force upon them any relationships, economic or cultural, but that it stands ready to respond to any overture they may make in these fields.

What applies to Asia applies to the Arabs. If the West can secure genuine Arab neutrality—and even now it is not too late for this—it will have emerged from the present crisis with remarkable success. Needless to say, this would require drastic revisions in foreign policy. Still more important, it would require a change in attitudes.

Arabs, like other Asians, must be taken seriously. Their genuine, though often inadequate, attempts to cope with the far-reaching economic, social, cultural and political revolutions they are undergoing should receive more sympathy. Above all, Arab nationalism and the drive towards greater Arab unity must be understood for what they are: deep and powerful forces, neither more nor less emotional or irrational than other nationalisms. It is a great mistake to say, as did the *New York Herald Tribune* on November 17, 1957: "There is just no such thing as 'Arab solidarity,' except against Israel."

With or against the West, the Arabs are going to achieve a greater degree of unity, and there is no intrinsic reason why it should be against the West. Finally, it must be realized that the leader of Arab nationalism—albeit a very recent convert to the cause—is Egypt. Whether the West likes it or not,

Egypt has, in the eyes of the vast majority of Arabs, no serious rival for leadership.

It is now necessary to deal with the second vital interest of the West in the Middle East, viz., to keep the oil flowing to Europe. Here too a global solution is necessary. The present dependence of Europe on Middle Eastern—and particularly Arab—oil is unhealthy for both parties. Europe is too vulnerable, and this makes it prone to irrational behavior as during the Suez crisis; and the Arabs—and more particularly Egypt and Syria, neither of whom is an oil exporter—have a quasi-monopolistic position which they are sometimes tempted to abuse.

The first task of Western statesmanship must be to reduce that dependence by developing substitutes. Exploration in Africa and Latin America has recently been intensified. Programs for greatly expanding the production of nuclear energy are being implemented. Costs of producing oil from shale have been reduced and may soon be at a level which will make production profitable—and it must not be forgotten that United States reserves of shale oil alone are greater than the proved oil reserves of the whole world. The gasification of low grade coal to produce petroleum is now being undertaken on a commercial scale in South Africa, and other countries with large coal reserves may soon follow this example.

The second task is to reduce the dependence of the West on the oil transit countries, Egypt and Syria. At present the bulk of Middle East oil passes through pipelines crossing Syria or through the Suez Canal, and the events of 1956 showed how vulnerable those two routes are. Three measures are being carried out: a pipeline from central Iran to the Mediterranean through Turkey; the building of a large fleet of supertankers (in September, 1957, alone orders for supertankers totalled 1,200,000 tons) able if necessary to carry oil round Africa at a reasonable cost; and the improvement of terminal facilities in both the Persian Gulf and the importing countries.

The third task must be to safeguard the Middle East oil supplies by convincing the peoples of the producing countries that it is in their interest to go on producing and selling to the West. In recent years, the oil

companies have shown increased awareness of this need; concession agreements have been revised to give local governments a greater share of benefits and welfare schemes have been launched by the companies.

On their part, governments are devoting a larger proportion of oil revenues to economic and social development and so trying to show their people that they too may share in the benefits. All this is excellent, but it does not give ground for complacency.

Thus, if the Italian group which recently obtained a concession in Iran should start producing on a large scale it is practically certain that other Middle Eastern—and indeed Latin American—governments will seek to bring their agreements in line with that concession, i.e., they will demand 75 per cent instead of 50 per cent of profits. Such claims should be granted before matters have come to a head.

The vital interest of the West is not the amount of profits it draws from oil operations: it is to keep the oil flowing at a price which is not exorbitant. For, in conclusion, the flow of oil is a vital interest, and one which the United States must be prepared to defend at all costs for at least another decade or two. Power politics implies a readiness to use power and the United States must neither relinquish that instrument of policy nor, what is even more dangerous, even give the impression that it is prepared to relinquish it.

To convince the Arabs that all that is wanted of them is genuine neutrality; to aid them in strengthening and preserving that neutrality; to grant important economic and political concessions; and yet at the same time to make it clear that there are certain vital interests which the United States will not give up and to keep which it is prepared to use *all means* at its disposal—this is the truly formidable task confronting American diplomacy in the Middle East. And in a democracy like the United States, diplomacy can reach that goal only if it is backed by a public opinion and press with attitudes different from the ones presently prevailing. Until mutual respect and understanding have replaced prejudice and misrepresentation, there can be no satisfactory relations with the Arabs.

"Possibly the greatest contribution which the United States could make to Pakistan, to the improvement of its relations with India and to Indo-Pakistan relations as well, and to its broad objective of helping to create 'situations of strength' where there is now weakness, would be to increase the amount of its economic assistance to both India and Pakistan and to do all it can to foster improved relations between the two great states of the Indian subcontinent," according to the views of this specialist.

The United States and Pakistan

BY NORMAN D. PALMER

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ONE OF the great tasks of American foreign policy is to attempt to work out more satisfactory relations with the countries of Asia, which are moving toward a new position in international affairs and toward a new relationship with the Western world. It is perhaps not surprising that the richest and most powerful of the white nations of the West should be suspect in a part of the world that is poor, weak in power political terms, inhabited by colored peoples, and distrustful of the West; but fortunately the United States has many advantages in its favor, and it has many more friends in Asia, in all parts and at all levels,

than it may realize. It would be a great tragedy indeed if the United States, with its traditions of democracy and anti-colonialism, with a profound respect for the decent opinion of mankind, could not forge strong ties with peoples who have waged a successful struggle for national independence and who are now engaged in the even more formidable task of preserving that independence and of making it meaningful.

In seeking to improve its relations with Asia the United States must rely heavily on those Asian peoples who are friendly toward it. One of the nations with which it is on the friendliest terms is Pakistan. Pakistan is one of the strangest states in the world today, and is beset by a host of troubles—political, economic, social, geographical. It is still almost unknown, as far as the United States is concerned. But it is one of the most important of the new countries of Asia, and much depends upon its future evolution.

It is the seventh largest nation in the world, in terms of population. It is either the largest or the second largest Muslim nation. It occupies a strategic position in a strategic part of the world. Its division into two parts, separated by some 1,000 miles, is an obvious source of weakness, made more serious by the unhappy state of its relations with its neighbor in the Indian subcontinent; but, as C. L. Sulzberger has stated, "this weird geography gives Pakistan a special significance in political strategy."¹

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¹ "The United States Invests in an Asian Triple Play," *The New York Times*, Feb. 5, 1955.

Because of its division it is oriented in two directions at the same time. East Pakistan looks toward Southeast Asia, whereas West Pakistan looks toward the Middle East, the center of the Muslim world.

In international affairs Pakistan is one of the most "committed" nations in Asia, in contrast with its neighbor, India, which likes to feel that it is one of the least committed. Pakistan is the western anchor of SEATO and the eastern anchor of the Baghdad Pact. It is the only Asian country which is associated with both of the major collective security arrangements in the Asian area. It has a mutual defense agreement with the United States, from which it is receiving substantial military as well as economic aid. It holds that neutrality is neither morally right nor politically realistic. The leaders of Pakistan have not hesitated to speak out fearlessly on major international problems, and generally they have agreed with the Western countries on the nature of present threats and the proper way of dealing with them. They seem to harbor fewer fears and fewer complexes in their attitudes toward Westerners than most of their fellow-Asians.

Americans who are sometimes taken aback by the suspicions and misunderstandings regarding American intentions and policies which they encounter in so many countries of Asia are usually pleasantly surprised to find a nation which is not afraid to associate itself with other countries, even including Western countries, which does not seek to ascribe sinister motives to the assistance it is receiving from the United States, and which seems genuinely glad to welcome Americans.

First impressions, of course, may be misleading—especially in Asia, where things are seldom what they seem. The impressions that Americans obtain in Pakistan are based largely upon the attitudes of the small minority of English-speaking and Western-oriented Pakistanis who, for the time being at least, have an influence in the country far out of proportion to their numbers. It is obviously impossible to tell what the prevailing attitudes of the masses of the people are; but it is probably safe to assume that most Pakistanis are absorbed with their own personal problems and with local considera-

tions and antipathies. Certainly they are not pro-Western in any meaningful sense; they are perhaps not anti-Western either, except to the extent that they nurse grievances from the colonial past and can be easily aroused against alleged outside interference. International affairs seldom come into their world. On such matters the attitudes of most people in India and Pakistan seem to be remarkably similar, save only for their feelings toward each other.

The United States is faced with problems of the first magnitude in working out more satisfactory relations with the underdeveloped countries in the non-Western world, and especially with the countries of Asia and of the Muslim world. In attempting to deal with these problems of future relationships the continuance of close and friendly contacts with Pakistan is a matter of vital concern. As long as Pakistan maintains its present orientation it can serve as a bridge between Asia and the West. The great drawbacks are its basic weaknesses and inner divisions and its strained relations with India. It is so absorbed with these problems that it is inevitably a weak and somewhat unreliable ally. The United States hopes that the economic and military assistance which it is giving Pakistan will help that country in dealing with its internal problems and will enable it to make a greater contribution to the defense of the free world.

Foreign Aid

Since the end of World War II the United States has spent more than 50 billion dollars in economic and military assistance to most of the nations of the non-Communist world. The largest amounts have gone for purposes of European recovery and for economic assistance; but in recent years the emphasis has shifted from economic to military aid, and from Europe to Asia. The recipients of most American aid at present are the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China (the Nationalist Government on Formosa), and the Republic of Vietnam. This assistance is obviously more military than economic, and is occasioned by the special circumstances and special needs of these areas. The recipient of the most economic

aid and technical assistance is India, which receives no military aid at all because it will accept none. Somewhat to Pakistan's chagrin, India's policy of "non-alignment" in world affairs and its outspoken criticisms of many aspects of American foreign policy have not debarred it from receiving substantial American assistance.

According to American sources, in the six years ending June 30, 1956, Pakistan received economic aid from the United States to the amount of \$361 million and military aid valued at \$171 million. The amount of United States aid to Pakistan is now running at approximately \$80 million to \$90 million a year. According to a report of the Government of Pakistan on "Foreign Aid and Its Utilisation in Pakistan," issued in November, 1956, up to the end of September, 1956, the United States had allocated nearly \$465 million in economic aid to Pakistan, out of a total of foreign aid from all sources of slightly over \$675 million.

Particularly appreciated was the prompt shipment of some 610,000 tons of wheat, valued at approximately \$68 million in 1953-1954, during a grave food crisis in Pakistan. This wheat helped to save hundreds of thousands of lives, and did more than any other single action of the United States to arouse good will toward America in Pakistan. In contrast with the long delay in approving and responding to a similar request from India in 1951, in this crisis the United States acted promptly and efficiently.² Considerable quantities of surplus food have been and are being sent to Pakistan. The value of these shipments up to November, 1957, was approximately \$170 million.

The extension of military aid to Pakistan has been one of the most controversial aspects of the United States foreign assistance program. It is wholly in accord with the over-all American policy of providing mili-

tary aid to free nations which request it, and would seem to be especially appropriate in the case of Pakistan, which does not have the resources to meet its military needs without outside help, which has entered into a mutual security agreement with the United States, and which is a member of both SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. The objection to this move, of course, stems from the violence of India's protests against it, and the harmful effects it has had upon Indo-American relations.

When the rumors of this intended decision became rife in late 1953, the Government of India protested and Nehru and other Indian spokesmen publicly warned that it would increase tensions in the sub-continent and impair Indo-American relations. The decision was taken only after careful consideration, with due regard to the probable reactions in India. In his statement announcing this decision, issued on February 24, 1954, President Eisenhower declared: "I can say that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression I will undertake immediately . . . appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression." In a personal letter to Prime Minister Nehru Mr. Eisenhower repeated this assurance, and promised that any request from India for military assistance "would receive my most sympathetic consideration."

The Prime Minister of Pakistan pledged that United States military aid would be used only for defense. The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Pakistan, signed on May 19, 1954, contained the commitment that Pakistan would not undertake any act of aggression and would use the aid "exclusively to maintain her internal security and legitimate defense, or to permit her to participate in the defense of the region or in United Nations collective security arrangements." The United States has repeatedly assured India that it will come to India's assistance if that country is attacked by Pakistan. India's leaders have not been much impressed with these assurances, however well meant, and they have argued that the practical effects of arms aid to Pakistan

² The request for the wheat was officially presented to the U. S. Government on April 22, 1953; a special mission sent to Pakistan to study the situation reported in May; on June 10 President Eisenhower sent a message to Congress recommending a grant of wheat to Pakistan; the bill authorizing the Commodity Credit Corporation to make the wheat available was passed by the Congress and signed by the President on June 25; the first shipment arrived in Karachi on July 21; and by the end of the year two-thirds of the 610,000 tons had reached Pakistan. "At the height of the program there were 28 ships on the high seas at one time carrying wheat to Pakistan." See *Summary Report: The Pakistan Wheat Program of 1953-54*, Foreign Operations Administration, July 7, 1954.

on Indo-Pakistan relations have been most unfortunate. They take a dim view of any military pact, and this one hits them in a particularly sensitive spot.

Effects of Military Aid

Whereas the effects of United States arms aid to Pakistan upon Indo-American relations are readily apparent, it is less easy to determine whether that aid has achieved the purposes for which it was extended. Quite possibly it has contributed to good relations between the United States and Pakistan, has given Pakistan a better defensive posture, and has made it a more effective and willing participant in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact.

United States arms aid has also had unwholesome consequences, in addition to the adverse effects upon United States relations with India. Among these the following are most apparent: (1) it has encouraged Pakistan to build up its defense establishment to levels which it cannot maintain out of its own resources, and therefore has increased the already unhealthy degree of dependence on the United States; (2) there are grounds for believing that the purposes for which the United States is extending military aid to Pakistan are not the same as those which have motivated the Pakistanis in receiving it; and (3) it has possibly encouraged Pakistan to take a more belligerent approach to India with respect to the Kashmir question, and it may have strengthened the Pakistani view that on this question, and on others, the United States should throw its support to its Asian ally, as a reasonable *quid pro quo* for Pakistan's willingness to associate with the United States.

Thanks to American aid many non-Communist countries are maintaining armed forces which are larger than their own economies can sustain. In every case there are powerful reasons for these inflated military establishments, but one of the inevitable consequences is an excessive dependence on the United States for an indefinite period and/or an excessive drain on a country's resources, which are desperately needed for more constructive purposes. Pakistan is devoting approximately half its budget to mili-

tary expenditures, and it is alleged that it is dependent on the United States for nearly 40 per cent of its total budget. The Finance Minister of Pakistan, a good friend of the United States and a former Pakistani Ambassador to this country, has publicly stated that Pakistan should "face grim realities" and stop depending so much on American assistance. He has suggested a limit on "Pakistan's commitments to the United States."

Even with American aid Pakistan finds it difficult to maintain the present levels of its armed forces. Whether these levels are too high is a debatable question. The Pakistanis are acutely conscious of the fact that Pakistan's expenditures for military purposes are only about one-third those of India, that in fact its total budget is only about one-half the amount that India spends on national defense alone. Without reasonably strong and well-organized armed forces Pakistan might have more serious troubles at home and much less prestige abroad; but the fact remains that the present level of defense expenditures increases Pakistan's dependence on the United States and reduces its already limited capacity to deal with its long-range problems.

In its foreign relations Pakistan is primarily concerned with its relations with India, and as far as the majority of Pakistanis are concerned arms aid is useful only to the extent that it strengthens them *vis-à-vis* their larger neighbor. There is doubtless considerable truth in the conclusion of William Clark that "the people of Pakistan accept American aid because Mr. Nehru has said that they should *not* do so; for them it is part of an anti-Indian policy, not part of a pro-western policy."³ "Fact is," wrote Keyes Beech of the Chicago *Daily News* in a dispatch from Karachi, "Pakistan isn't very excited about communism. Pakistan gets on quite well with Red China. Nor is Pakistan mad at Russia, although it was scared when Bulganin and Khrushchev endorsed India's claim to Kashmir. Pakistanis feel that their real enemy is India, with Afghanistan a runnerup."⁴

³ William Clark, "The Pakistan-Turkey Pact: Many Bricks, Little Mortar," *The Reporter*, June 8, 1954, pp. 25-26.

⁴ "Pakistan: Coldness on Kashmir Ends Honeymoon with U. S.," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, March 5, 1956.

The most troublesome of the many issues in dispute between India and Pakistan is undoubtedly the Kashmir question. India bases its claim to this area on the accession of the Maharajah of Kashmir to India in the fall of 1947, and it charges Pakistan with aggression in Kashmir. The choice parts of the State, including the lovely Valley of Kashmir, have been associated with India since 1947. As far as India is concerned, the Kashmir question is in fact settled; Kashmir is an integral part of India, and that is that.

Kashmir

Pakistan, in turn, denies the validity of India's title to Kashmir, and insists that India be compelled to live up to the promise, made in 1947 at the time of the Maharajah's accession, that as soon as conditions were more settled the people of Kashmir would be given an opportunity to determine their own future, by means of a plebiscite. In this demand Pakistan has received considerable support from the Security Council of the United Nations, which still has the Kashmir question on its agenda and which is still on record in favor of a plebiscite.⁵ Pakistan has repeatedly accepted proposals made by the United Nations Representative or the Security Council, while India has rejected most of these proposals. India is quite indignant at the position taken by the Security Council, and at the unfavorable criticism it has been receiving in the United States and Britain for its adamant stand on Kashmir.

If India is thoroughly unhappy over the United States stand on the Kashmir question, Pakistan is only slightly less so. The United States would like to avoid any direct involvement in this bitter dispute between two countries with which it wishes to remain on good terms, and it would be only too happy to support almost any "solution" of the question that would be acceptable to both India and Pakistan.

Pakistan wants the United States to support its position on the Kashmir question much more vigorously, apparently both because it feels that its cause is just and because the United States is its ally. This feeling was strongly manifest when Bulganin and Khrushchev endorsed India's claim to Kashmir. Pakistanis then looked to the United States for equally unequivocal support, but got nothing more than the suggestion that the question be again referred to the United Nations. They seemed to assume that because the Russian leaders had openly supported India, the United States should as openly side with its ally, Pakistan, and they were bitterly disappointed when the United States failed to act as expected.

This disappointment has lingered, and still finds expression from time to time. The leading newspaper of Pakistan, *Dawn*, in a long editorial on "Foreign Policy" in its issue of February 27, 1957, for example, made this pointed and none-too-subtle comment:

There have undoubtedly been signs that our present foreign policy has gained us more friends than before. The task is now of consolidating that friendship and sifting out the friends from the foes. While those who have been on the side of truth and justice in Kashmir have forged a new and deeper comradeship with the people of Pakistan, those that choose to stand on the fence in this vital issue may no longer be counted as our friends, however prepossessing their exterior or voluble their peaceable professions. On this criterion of value we must continue to reappraise our international relations. In this momentous fight between right and wrong, those who are not with us are in fact against us.

In this frank statement *Dawn* reflected a widespread feeling in Pakistan that because that country is willing to cooperate with the United States in security arrangements and because it receives American military aid, it therefore has a right to expect the United States to support it on all major issues, including the complicated Kashmir question, on which there is much to be said on both sides. In winding up a major debate on foreign affairs in the National Assembly on February 25, 1957, H. S.

⁵ In December, 1957, the Security Council instructed the United Nations Representative, Dr. Frank Graham, to make another trip to South Asia to discuss ways and means of resolving the Kashmir dispute with the parties directly concerned.

Suhrawardy, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, stated this viewpoint quite clearly:

I am sure that those who have been responsible for the foreign policy of America and their relationship towards us must have blushed at the encomiums that have been showered upon them. Let this be a lesson to them that we in Pakistan acknowledge the merits of our friends; let them remember that as we whole-heartedly are with them, we expect them to be whole-heartedly with us, and they will find that perhaps—small though we are—they will not have greater and more loyal friends than ourselves. We expect from our friends, too, the same loyalty.

Thus far American military aid to Pakistan seems to have produced limited results but great expectations, at least on the part of Pakistan. It has aroused India as no other single American action has done. Under these circumstances the time may have come to reappraise the policy of extending arms aid to Pakistan, on the scale and in the manner in which it is now being extended.

Possibly the greatest contribution which the United States could make to Pakistan, to the improvement of its relations with India and to Indo-Pakistan relations as well, and to its broad objective of helping to create "situations of strength" where there is now weakness, would be to increase the amount of its economic assistance to both India and Pakistan and to do all it can to foster improved relations between the two great states of the Indian subcontinent. Just

as it must disagree with India in regard to the value of mutual security arrangements, so must it disagree with Pakistan on the proper policy which it should follow with regard to India.

It is clearly in the interests of the United States, and in the long run in the interests of India and Pakistan as well, for the world's most powerful democracy to attempt to establish as friendly relations as possible with both India and Pakistan. It would be a shortsighted policy indeed for either of these two states to insist that the price of its friendship and cooperation is American hostility to the other.⁶ This is a price that the United States should not pay, and one that it should not be asked to pay.

Certainly, however, the United States should make every effort to convince Pakistan that close friendship and cooperation with the United States and other free nations are wise and sound policies. Perhaps it should make a similar effort to convince the American people that the friendship and cooperation of Pakistan are jewels of great price. "Inescapably," as Ernest K. Lindley pointed out during a visit to Pakistan,

we have a stake in the success of this Moslem nation of nearly 80 million people. The stake was there before the Manila pact, but through this alliance our prestige is, to some extent, involved. Happily, despite obvious difficulties in converting Pakistan into a strong modern nation, it is involved with self-respecting people of great resolution.⁷

The ties that bind Americans and Pakistanis are far more powerful than those resulting from official cooperation or association in military arrangements. It is time for these good friends to get to know each other better.

⁶ Malik Firoz Khan Noon, then Foreign Minister and now Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister of Pakistan, was quoted in *The New York Times* of Sept. 22, 1957, as saying "that any country, bank or individual loaning money to India would be committing an unfriendly act against Pakistan."

⁷ "An Asian Friend of Ours," *Newsweek*, April 18, 1955.

"Let us not forget that the integrity and efficiency of the judicial process is the first essential in a democratic society. The confidence of the people in the administration of justice is a prime requisite for free representative government. The public entrusts the legal profession with the sacred mission of dealing with the vital affairs that affect the whole pattern of human relations . . ."

—Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., of the United States Supreme Court in an address on March 11, 1957.

Noting that "there seems to be no alternative," this author believes that "If the United States is to pursue a successful policy in North Africa, it must be prepared to incur the disfavor of France."

The North African Challenge

BY BENJAMIN RIVLIN

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JUST ONE month before last December's NATO summit meeting, the three leading members of the Western alliance—the United States, Great Britain and France—became involved in a public controversy among themselves over the United States-British delivery of small arms to Tunisia. Protesting angrily against this shipment to France's former protectorate on grounds that the arms would find their way into the hands of the Algerian rebels, French delegates stalked out of the NATO consultative conference of legislators meeting in Paris at the time.

A grave shadow was thus cast over the impending NATO summit meeting, and for a while it appeared that the newly formed French government of Premier Felix Gailard would not be able to weather the storm of criticism in the French National Assembly, leaving France without a government at the time of the meeting. Fortunately, a full scale breach was averted when France received assurances from Secretary of State Dulles that the shipment to Tunisia was intended exclusively for Tunisian internal security and self-defense and that a policy on future

arms shipments to Tunisia would be worked out in discussions among France, Tunisia, the United States and the United Kingdom.

Attaining a face-saving formula in time to permit the summit conference to proceed has not resolved the fundamental causes of the controversy. It has, however, pointed up one of the most perplexing problems confronting United States foreign policy makers, namely the formulation and implementation of our policy towards North Africa.

It may well be asked what brought on this serious situation just at the crucial moment when all efforts were being expended to strengthen the NATO alliance. What prompted the United States and Great Britain to permit this crisis to be precipitated at this time? Answers to these questions point to a long smoldering situation in our relations with France and North Africa which has flared up during the past year and which threatens to develop into a distressing crisis in Franco-American-North African relations.

During and after World War II, native nationalist movements among the Muslim populations of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria began to assert themselves. In step with the postwar march towards independence of colonial peoples throughout the world, the nationalists in North Africa demanded and fought for the freedom of their lands from French colonial rule. As the nationalist challenge to French rule developed, it became increasingly evident that French policy was unable to contain this rising tide of nationalism and that on the contrary it was wittingly or unwittingly aiding and abetting its growth. For example, the arrest of the moderate nationalist Prime Minister of Tunisia, Mohammed Chenik, in January,

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1952, and the deposition of the Moroccan Sultan, Mohammed V, in August, 1953, only reinforced the determination of the nationalists to achieve their goals and brought them popular support that they had not known before.

Part of the nationalist campaign was an appeal to world public opinion—particularly to the United States and the United Nations—to support their struggle in accordance with the principles of self-determination as set down in the Atlantic and United Nations Charters. Although the United States and France had fundamentally different approaches to colonialism, the United States generally supported the French position in North Africa throughout this period. This was in keeping with the policy laid down during World War II by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who although anxious to see the self-determination pledges of the Atlantic Charter applied to colonial territories, felt that “we could not alienate” our European allies.¹

Thus, for example, when, in 1951, United States security interests called for the establishment of air bases in Morocco, the United States yielded to the French viewpoint that the accord of the Sultan of Morocco was not necessary. Legally and technically the French viewpoint was correct, for France was exercising a protectorate over Morocco and all that was necessary was France’s accord. But within the United States government, there were those who believed that in the interests of gaining the support and understanding of the people of Morocco in whose midst the bases were to be constructed, it would only be politic to secure the consent of the nominal sovereign, the Sultan.

The United States similarly supported the French position in the United Nations debates on the various occasions when the Moroccan, Tunisian and Algerian questions were raised. The United States stood by its support of the French position in North Africa, despite the fact that the Soviet Union was championing the cause of dissident nationalist movements in Western colonies, within and without the United Nations.

At this point the rationale for the United

States policy can be stated as follows: France was an important American ally, occupying a unique position in the Western defense system. Accordingly, it was not in the best interest of the United States to undermine its position in its overseas territories. Furthermore, the best interests of the free world were being protected by the continued presence of French power in Northwest Africa.

Independence and Afterward

With the achievement of independence by Tunisia and Morocco in 1956, the situation in North Africa has changed markedly, and accordingly so have the demands on American foreign policy towards the area. Much as the United States would have preferred to continue to recognize France’s prior rights in Tunisia and Morocco, it has found it difficult to do so. At the outset, United States foreign policy makers hoped that it would be possible to avoid a sharp reversal of American policy towards North Africa and France. Part of this hope was based on the strong ties existing between France and her two former protectorates, even after independence.

In fact, the independence agreements between France and Morocco and Tunisia respectively envisaged a system of cultural, economic, financial and possibly military interdependence with France. As France preferred to view it, and as the United States seemed to be viewing it as well, France’s primary interests in Morocco and Tunisia were acknowledged and Morocco and Tunisia, although independent, were to constitute a French “sphere of influence.” When in June, 1956, the United States decided to send an emergency relief shipment of wheat to Tunisia, the matter was first cleared with the French government. In similar vein, when Vice-President Richard Nixon visited Morocco and Tunisia in March, 1957, he let it be known that the United States viewed France as the major source of economic aid to these countries and that any American aid could only be supplementary to that given by France.

Even as late as the recent controversy over the arms shipment to Tunisia, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles indicated that

¹ See *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, N.Y.*, The Macmillan Co., 1948, Vol. II, pp. 1237-1239, 1599.

the United States would have been happy, and would be happy in the future, if Tunisia would get arms from France. As he put it, "the relations between France and Tunisia are historic, are many, and we would prefer to have the relationship carried out on that basis rather than upon a new arrangement with other countries."²

Having achieved independent status, Tunisia and Morocco were however beginning to act as independent states. Despite their close relations with France, they were not content to remain exclusively within a French "sphere of influence." They have sought and have established relations of all sorts with nations all over the world. From the very outset of their independence, President Bourguiba of Tunisia and King Mohammed V of Morocco have not hidden their pro-Western inclinations, and both hoped to benefit from the overseas aid programs of the United States.

But due partly to American unwillingness to undercut the French position in these countries (and partly due to the fact that Congress has not put an unlimited sum for overseas aid at the disposal of our foreign policy makers) this aid has been slow in coming. This in turn gave rise to dissatisfaction among North Africans with American policy and fears that the United States had no interest in their problems.

Last May, following the visit of President Eisenhower's special envoy, former Congressman James P. Richards, Bourguiba sharply criticized the United States for its solicitude over French sensibilities by continuing to regard Tunisia as a French sphere of influence, particularly in refusing to grant military aid to Tunisia, when such aid was being granted other countries Mr. Richards had visited. Irrked by what he considered to be a United States policy of taking for granted countries which had unequivocally chosen alliance with the free world, such as Tunisia, while placing a financial premium on flirtation with Communists, Bourguiba warned that such a policy can only lead to Western losses to communism.

Morocco, too, indicated dissatisfaction with the extent of American aid and it soon became apparent that there was a direct relationship between the amount of Amer-

ican economic aid and the presence of American air bases in Morocco. With the Soviet Union stepping up its campaign to woo the African and Asian peoples, the stage was set for a change in American policy towards North Africa.

It seems clear that Vice-President Nixon had the situation in Tunisia and Morocco in mind when he reported to President Eisenhower on his trip to Africa that "Africa is a priority target for the international Communist movement" and that "the Communist threat underlies the wisdom and necessity of our assisting the countries of Africa to maintain their independence and to alleviate the conditions of want and instability on which communism breeds." Also, in obvious reference to France and its relations with Tunisia and Morocco, he recommended that the United States should encourage the continuation of special ties between the independent states of Africa and European states "*where they are considered mutually advantageous by the states concerned,*" but that "*we should take them in account in formulating our own policies to the extent compatible with the fundamental requirement of conducting our own relations with those states on a fully equal . . . basis.*"³

In a sense the Nixon trip, despite the previously mentioned temporizing statement concerning the priority of French interests in Tunisia and Morocco, represents a recognition on the part of American policy makers that the United States must begin a new role in the area. The mere fact that he visited Morocco and Tunisia was an indication of heightened American interest in the problems of these two newly independent countries. It reflected an awareness that the time had come for the United States to pursue a more independent policy in Northwest Africa if the area were not to be softened up for a repetition of Soviet inroads into Egypt and Syria.

Following the Nixon visit, the change in United States policy was felt with the stepping up of American economic aid and technical assistance to Morocco and Tunisia. But it was not until last September when

² Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 963, December 9, 1957, p. 920.

³ *Ibid.* (Vol. XXXVI, No. 930, April 22, 1957, p. 638. (Italics added.)

President Bourguiba, following months of border clashes on the Tunisian-Algerian frontier, appealed to the United States for aid in making military purchases that the new turn in American policy was dramatically expressed. When Bourguiba made the request, the United States found it impossible to turn him down. Vice-President Nixon had only recently returned lauding Bourguiba as a friend of the West who merited United States support.

Since Tunisia, the State Department said, had "freely chosen to identify itself with the West," the United States felt that it was incumbent upon the Western countries to provide Tunisia the opportunity "to purchase its means of defense from Western sources." Yet even at this point the United States was reluctant to jump fully into the situation and to disregard France entirely in the matter. On September 25, 1957, the State Department let it be known, that while the United States itself was not going to supply arms to Tunisia, it was going to use its good offices to help Tunisia obtain such arms from Western European suppliers by the end of October. It was hoped that France would be the provider, but at the same time other Western European states such as Belgium, Italy and the Scandinavian countries were also considered as possible sources. When the French government of Premier Maurice Bourges-Maunoury fell shortly thereafter, Bourguiba agreed to defer the delivery date until November 12, 1957.⁴

Between September and the new deadline, the United States tried vainly to persuade France to provide the arms to Tunisia. But the plan broke down when France attached conditions which were unacceptable to President Bourguiba. France wanted Tunisia to agree that it would not accept arms from any other source but Tunisia rejected this condition as an affront to its sovereignty. Amid rumors that arms shipments were on their way to Tunisia from Russia and Egypt, the United States announced on November 14 that it had decided "to deliver in concert with the Government of the United Kingdom, a shipment of small arms and ammunitions for defensive purposes."⁵

According to Secretary of State Dulles,

the United States had given its word to Tunisia that it would have the delivery by November 12 and had expected that France would provide the arms unconditionally. When the arms delivery did not occur, he said "we felt obligated to carry through on our promise." Thus, for the first time, the United States took an action that was not only independent of the French but was also diametrically opposed to French wishes and desires. Certainly, the State Department knew full well what the French reaction would be and was willing to take the action, notwithstanding the fact that the NATO summit conference was just one month away. It did so because it came to the conclusion that the preservation of Western influence in Tunisia was an important enough issue upon which to risk French disfavor. This marks a notable shift in American policy towards North Africa.

Although not so dramatic a move as the arms shipment to Tunisia, another manifestation of the shift in United States policy is the warm welcome accorded King Mohammed V of Morocco on his recent visit to the United States. Not too long ago a visit by the King of Morocco could hardly be contemplated let alone undertaken. The fact that the visit took place and was so successful indicates how far things have gone in the development of closer relations between Morocco and the United States, to the exclusion of France. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the joint Moroccan-United States statement issued at the White House on November 27, 1957, on the occasion of King Mohammed's visit, spoke of negotiations between Morocco and the United States on the future of the American air and naval bases in Morocco.⁶

France has insisted that it must be consulted in any negotiations over the future of the bases, since the bases are technically French bases in Morocco and France has *ad hoc* arrangements with Morocco for the continuation of its military installations in the country. The Moroccan government, however, has insisted upon direct negotiations with the United States on the matter

⁴ *Ibid.* Vol. XXXVII, No. 962, December 2, 1957, p. 882.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.* Vol. XXXVII, No. 964, December 16, 1957, p. 956.

of the bases and it seems that it has won this point from the United States.

While United States policy towards Tunisia and Morocco seems to be undergoing significant change, its position with regard to Algeria remains appreciably the same. The American attitude is still what it has been since the outbreak of the fighting in November, 1954, namely, that this was a matter of French domestic jurisdiction which France should solve itself. The United States, well aware of the serious repercussions the Algerian war is having on its neighbors, anxiously hopes for a settlement of the question, but it has been unwilling to go any further than to say that it favors a "peaceful, democratic and just solution" to the problem.⁷

The State Department categorically rejected the thesis advanced by Senator John Kennedy of Massachusetts that the United States should cease supporting French policy in Algeria and espouse the cause of Algerian independence to insure North Africa's remaining in the Western camp.

When the Algerian issue was discussed in the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, Ambassador Lodge generally gave support to the French position although he indicated that the United States looked with favor on the offer of Tunisia and Morocco to use their good offices in mediating the Algerian war. Given the present mental attitude of the French people concerning the Algerian question, one that considers that anyone who is not with them 100 per cent is against them, the fact that a spokesman for the United States tried to steer a middle course in the United Nations debate may be yet another indication of a shift in American policy.

Faced with the dilemma of wanting to be friends with both the French and the people of North Africa, the United States first shied away from taking a categorical

stand on the problems of the area. In general, as one comes to expect from diplomats, the Department of State straddled the issues. But it soon became evident that such an indecisive policy would not work, and that diplomacy would have to be replaced by statesmanship.

With the situation in North Africa becoming more critical day by day, largely as a result of the unresolved and bitter Algerian war, the United States was forced to reconsider its policy. The prolongation of the Algerian fighting has produced fears that all North Africa may go the way of Nasser, for the effects of the war are felt not only in Algeria but in neighboring Tunisia and Morocco. As a consequence of the literal and figurative spilling over of the Algerian war into Tunisia and Morocco, both countries have been having great difficulty in normalizing their relations with France, which means difficulty in achieving economic stability and preserving internal security.

Consequently, the United States took decisive steps to prevent the loss of Morocco and Tunisia to the West by extending economic aid, supplying arms to Tunisia and by going out of its way to demonstrate its friendship for Morocco. One can expect that in the future the United States will be called upon to take further steps in this direction, for against the background of the Algerian war and mounting Egyptian and Soviet pressure it will take more than the shipment of 500 automatic rifles to Tunisia to buttress the Western position in Tunisia and Morocco. In becoming further involved in North African affairs, the United States will undoubtedly incur the wrath of France.⁸ But it is here that the lesson of the arms shipment to Tunisia is clear—the United States cannot have it both ways. If the United States is to pursue a successful policy in North Africa, it must be prepared to incur the disfavor of France. It is not pleasant to antagonize our oldest ally, but until France extricates itself from the box it has gotten into on the Algerian question, there seems to be no alternative for the United States but to develop an independent policy in support of its friends in Morocco and Tunisia, and perhaps also in Algeria as well.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ After the completion of this article, the basic dilemma confronting the United States in its efforts to satisfy both its French ally and its North African friends was once again underlined. This time it was the wrath of the North Africans that was incurred, when the United States was instrumental in making \$625,000,000 of economic aid available to France. The money was necessary to help extricate France from the economic difficulties it had gotten into largely as a result of the military operations in Algeria. Reporting from North Africa in *The New York Times* on January 28, 1958, Thomas F. Brady wrote that the economic aid to France was viewed in Morocco and Tunisia as American support of the French war in Algeria.

"Peace is a product of stability which is not likely to be maintained by giving a crusade for an ideology priority over respect for international law and political negotiation to adjust differences." This specialist criticizes "the policy of not recognizing the Communist government of China . . . because of its adverse effect, viewing the world as a whole, on international tensions, on the stability of the balance of power, on respect for international law, and on the effectiveness of the United Nations."

Non-Recognition of China and International Tensions

BY QUINCY WRIGHT

Professor Emeritus of International Law, University of Chicago

THE continued non-recognition of the Communist government of China by the United States is contrary to the normal expectation of international law and to the traditional foreign policy of the United States initiated by Washington when he recognized the revolutionary government of France in 1793. The normal expectation of international law was indicated by Chief Justice Taft, as arbitrator in the controversy between Great Britain and Costa Rica concerning the status of the *de facto* government of General Tinoco of Costa Rica. He decided that in spite of non-recognition by the principal powers "the Tinoco govern-

ment was an actual sovereign government . . . according to the standard set by international law," and was therefore capable of binding Costa Rica. The traditional American policy was set forth by Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State under Washington: "We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own government is founded—that everyone may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will. . . . The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded."

It is true that many writers have held that, in spite of this expectation and this tradition, recognition or non-recognition is a political question which each government is free to decide according to the exigencies of its national interest in each case. Secretary of State Dulles asserted this position in his San Francisco address of June 28, 1957, when he said, in respect to the state seeking recognition, "recognition is always a privilege, never a right" and, in respect to the state withholding it, "recognition is admitted to be an instrument of national policy to serve enlightened self-interest."

The Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1950, while agreeing that the "act of recognition is still regarded as essentially a political decision, which each state decides in accordance with its own free appreciation of the situation," thought that acceptance of the credentials of delegates to United Nations agencies should be governed

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by the principle: "Where a revolutionary government presents itself as representing a state, in rivalry to an existing government, the question at issue should be which of these two governments in fact is in a position to employ the resources and direct the people of the state in fulfilment of the obligations of membership." Going even further, the distinguished international lawyer and judge of the International Court of Justice, Hersh Lauterpacht, has written: "The emphasis—and that emphasis is a constant feature of diplomatic correspondence—on the principle that the existence of a state (or of a government) is a question of fact signifies that, whenever the necessary factual requirements exist, the granting of recognition is a matter of legal duty."

It can hardly be doubted that the Communist government of China is and has been for eight years, in the words of former President and Chief Justice Taft, "the actual sovereign government according to the standard set by international law." It controls the entire territory of China with the exception of the small islands of Quemoy and Matsu off the coast of Fukien province and there appears to be no opposition threatening that control in any foreseeable future. The rival government of General Chiang-kai Shek, apart from the small coastal islands, governs Formosa and the Pescadores which were Japanese territory before World War II and not legally integrated into China.

Consequently, it is not surprising that the departure from normal expectations in the United States' refusal to recognize the actual government of China or to support its claim to represent China in the United Nations and the specialized agencies has been a source of tension in United States' relations with many countries. This tension varies among different states and may be discussed with reference (1) to China itself, (2) to China's neighbors, (3) to the states of the Bandung conference, (4) to the states of the Warsaw Pact, (5) to the Nato, Commonwealth and Latin American states, and (6) to the United Nations.

The Effect on China

1. With respect to China itself, there can

be no doubt that the Communist government and the majority of China's 600 million people regard American non-recognition as a grievance augmenting their bitterness against the United States arising from American anti-communism, support of Chiang and leadership of United Nations' action in Korea, stimulated by incessant anti-American propaganda by the Communist government. There can be no certainty that recognition would have any immediate effect in decreasing this bitterness, nor can it be certain that even with recognition the Communist government would immediately exchange diplomatic officers with the United States. All that can be said is that there is no likelihood that relations between the United States and China will improve as long as non-recognition continues. Recognition accompanied by a termination of the trade and cultural embargoes and of opposition to the representation of the Communist government in the United Nations would regularize relations and open the way for solution of the issues concerning the imprisoned American soldiers, of the latent hostilities in the Straits of Formosa, and of the division of Korea and Vietnam. It would also provide China with the opportunity to develop commercial and cultural relations outside the Soviet orbit, thus reducing its dependence upon, and the strength of its alliance with, the Soviet Union.

Recognition of the Communist government of China would, of course, discourage the government of Chiang-kai Shek and probably most of the 10 million Chinese in Taiwan, because it would end any lingering hope of recovery of the Chinese mainland. Recognition might even result in the integration of Formosa and the Pescadores with mainland China and termination of the Chiang government. This result, however, would not be certain. The United States has at times spoken of a "two Chinas policy," and negotiations preceding or following recognition might result in the establishment of a new state of Taiwan and in its admission to the United Nations.

The effect of recognition on the several million overseas Chinese would vary. Many of them both in the United States and in Southeast Asia have remained loyal to the

Chiang government and many students have gone to Taiwan for study. There is, however, evidence that many of the overseas Chinese recognize Mao Tse-tung's government of China and, in spite of their reservations on communism, associate themselves with China. Recognition would doubtless increase this trend although if Taiwan became an independent state some overseas Chinese might elect its nationality. It may be concluded that recognition would reduce United States tension with China and with the great majority of the Chinese people.

China's Neighbors

2. Among China's neighbors, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Burma, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Indonesia, North Korea, North Vietnam, Mongolia and the Soviet Union with a combined population of over 800 million or a third of the world's population have recognized the Communist government. United States' recognition would tend to reduce tensions with these states. Tension from non-recognition has been especially evident in India whose government and people generally regard United States persistence in non-recognition as vindictive and irrational, or even as evidence of an imperialist policy in Asia.

Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, Cambodia, Laos, South Korea and South Vietnam with a combined population of some 150 million have not recognized the Communist government. Japan, however, whose population constitutes nearly two-thirds of the population of this group, has been anxious to increase commercial relations with China. Japan has been influenced mainly by the United States in withholding recognition, and would probably be happy to go along with the United States in a policy of recognition.

South Korea and South Vietnam, on the other hand, are strongly antagonistic to communism and would fear absorption by the Communist halves of their countries if the United States recognized Communist China. This result, however, would not be certain. Recognition would open the way for reunion on the basis of neutrality between the Communist and anti-Communist blocs in the

world. The states of Southeast Asia have had a problem with the Chinese minorities in their population and would doubtless fear that recognition of Communist China by the United States would turn these minorities towards communism. These states would probably follow the United States in recognition but might do so with some foreboding. They would face a problem of dealing with Chinese and Communist influence and infiltration. The United States would doubtless continue to give assistance in meeting this problem, and that assistance might be more effective if Chinese antagonism to the United States were moderated through recognition. It seems clear that the recognition of Communist China would tend to reduce tension between the United States and most of China's neighbors and the great mass of the population of East and Southeast Asia.

The States of Bandung

3. The Bandung Conference of 1955 of 29 states of Asia and Africa, including both India and China and representing over half of the world's population, was favorable to the recognition of Communist China. Of these 29 states, 12 have recognized the Communist government. The Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan are parties to the anti-Communist Seato Pact. Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan are parties to the anti-Communist Baghdad Pact. Some of these states might be opposed to United States recognition of Communist China although the largest, Pakistan, has recognized it. The overwhelming majority of the Asian and African states would welcome recognition by the United States as manifesting a more favorable attitude toward "equal rights and self-determination of peoples" included among the purposes of the United Nations Charter, and toward the Bandung principles of independence, equality, coexistence, non-aggression, non-intervention and anti-imperialism.

Warsaw Pact Nations

4. The Communist group of states, bound by the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet-Chinese alliance, constitute a third of the world's

population and have been led by the Soviet Union. That state is bound by close alliance with China and has repeatedly urged representation of China in the United Nations and the specialized agencies by the Communist government. It even withdrew its own representation in the United Nations from January to August, 1950, because of the refusal of the United Nations to accept its position. Other Communist states have taken a similar position although they did not withdraw their representation from the United Nations.

It has been suggested that the Soviet position was not sincere, that in fact it withdrew its representation in 1950 because it thought this would stem the tide of recognition, as indeed it did, and prevent acceptance of the Chinese Communist delegation by the United Nations. The Soviet government, it is suggested, thought non-recognition and non-representation would tend to drive China into closer alliance with the Soviet Union because China would have no other place to turn for economic and political assistance. If this supposition is true, United States recognition of Communist China might not, in fact, be welcomed by the Soviet Union. However, this suggestion of Soviet insincerity may not be correct and, in any case, the Soviet government could not publicly manifest anything but joy at recognition and admittance to the United Nations of its great ally which would thereby gain in stability and prestige. While the long-run effect of recognition might very well be to weaken the solidarity of the Communist bloc of states, its immediate effect would be to remove a cause of tension between the United States and that bloc.

The Nato States

5. Of the Nato states, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark have recognized Communist China as have Sweden and Switzerland which, although not members, belong to the European group. Undoubtedly United States non-recognition has been a factor of tension between the United States and its principal ally, the United Kingdom. The fact that four important Nato states recognize Communist

China suggests that there would be no important opposition by the Nato group to United States recognition. In fact, it seems probable that except for United States non-recognition, most of these states would have followed the United Kingdom in recognition in January, 1950.

Of the Commonwealth states, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan and Ceylon have recognized the Communist government of China. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ghana and Malaya would probably follow if the United States withdrew its opposition.

None of the Latin American states have recognized the Communist government of China, probably influenced by the United States and the Vatican. Many of them would probably follow the United States in recognition although some might not, because of Vatican opposition.

This brief summary suggests that United States recognition would probably reduce United States tension with Nato and Commonwealth states and would not affect its relations with Latin America in any important degree.

China and the U.N.

6. The United Nations, although in theory confined to "peace-loving states," is, in the opinion of most of its members, designed to be universal. They agree with Secretary of State Dulles' opinion, expressed in his book *War or Peace* first published in 1950 before he became secretary of state, that

the United Nations will best serve the cause of peace if its Assembly is representative of what the world actually is, and not merely representative of the parts which we like. Therefore, we ought to be willing that all the nations should be members without attempting to appraise closely those which are "good" and those which are "bad." . . . If the Communist government of China proves its ability to govern China without serious domestic resistance, then it, too, should be admitted to the United Nations. (p. 190.)

The exclusion of a quarter of the human race from representation in the United Nations militates against this ideal. There can

be little doubt that United States influence coupled with indignation at the Soviet Union's withdrawal was the major factor in preventing admission of the Communist Chinese delegation, contrary to the advice of the Secretary-General, before the Korean hostilities which began in June, 1950. American influence has certainly been the major factor in preventing acceptance of that government since the Korean armistice of 1953.

It seems probable that the United Nations would be strengthened by representation of the actual Chinese government and in particular that its capacity to deal with the serious threats to peace in the Far East would be increased. Secretary of State Dulles, hardly consistent with his earlier opinion, said in his San Francisco address of June, 1957, "Communist Russia, with veto power, already seriously limits the ability of the United Nations to serve its intended purposes. Were Communist China also to become a permanent, veto-wielding member of the Security Council, that would, I fear, implant in the United Nations the seeds of its own destruction." This perhaps flows from his statement earlier in this speech that: "The United Nations is not a reformatory for bad governments," suggesting that he now considers the United Nations a crusade of the "good" governments against the "bad" governments of the world.

Most of the members of the United Nations, as well as most students of international relations, regard the United Nations as an international organization of the world as it is to facilitate peaceful adjustment of international controversies and cooperation among all states to achieve common ends and maintain common values. It is difficult to see how a general characterization of governments as "good" or "bad" can contribute to this end.

Secretary Dulles' San Francisco address thus raises a basic issue as to the goals and methods of United States policy. In this address he defined policy towards Communist China as non-recognition, opposition to admittance to the United Nations, trade and cultural embargo.

Apart from a past record which he says indicates that the "Chinese Communist re-

gime does not conform to the practices of civilized nations," he argues for continuance of present policy on the grounds that recognition would discourage mainland Chinese opposed to the Communist government, would discourage overseas Chinese who send students to Taiwan in increasing numbers, would be an act of dishonor toward Nationalist China, would perplex free Asian governments of the Pacific and Southeast Asia, would result in seating China in the United Nations with a veto in the Security Council which might prove disastrous to that organization and would open the way to trade and cultural relations with the United States and probably with China's neighbors in Southeast Asia, opening them to Communist infiltration and subversion.

Secretary Dulles adds that international law does not require recognition of the Communist government even if it has governed China for a long time. Furthermore, the United States "need never succumb to the argument of 'inevitability.' We feel that we, with our friends, can fashion our own destiny." He insists that there is no proof that recognition would make China more independent of Russia, and, perhaps most significantly of all: "We know that the materialistic rule of international communism will never permanently serve the aspirations with which human beings are endowed by their Creator. . . . The Chinese people are, above all, individualists. We can confidently base our policies on the assumption that International Communism's rule of strict conformity is, in China as elsewhere, a passing and not a perpetual phase. We owe it to ourselves, our allies, and the Chinese people to do all that we can to contribute to that passing."

The Secretary does not discuss the difficulties which the government would encounter from strong domestic pressures, especially in Congress, maintained by active propaganda, if it decided to recognize Communist China. This factor has often obstructed the pursuit of a wise foreign policy.

In brief, the Secretary opposes recognition of the Communist government of China because that government has been a bad actor in the past, because recognition would not serve specific strategic interests in the cold

war, and because "we" hate communism. He thus raises the issue whether a policy based on a general characterization of nations by their past behavior, on augmentation of the cold war, and on ideological differences is wise.

Stability has always been at a minimum in a two-power world. An arms race has never been useful for peace. After the Thirty Years War, statesmen agreed that religion and ideologies ought to be kept out of international politics. *Cuius regia eius religio* was the basic principle of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) which constituted the fundamental structure of Europe for three centuries. Might it not be wise policy to stop calling names, to seek to reduce tensions and to ameliorate the cold war, and to treat ideologies as matters of domestic jurisdiction for each state?

Secretary Dulles says: "Our policies shall serve the great purposes to which our nation has been dedicated since its foundation—the cause of peace, justice and human liberty." But peace in a world of many cultures

requires a concept of justice broader than that of any one nation, and liberty can exist only under law which implies peace. *Inter arma leges silent*. Peace is a product of stability which is not likely to be maintained by giving a crusade for an ideology priority over respect for international law and political negotiation to adjust differences.

The policy of not recognizing the Communist government of China should be abandoned because of its adverse effect, viewing the world as a whole, on international tensions, on the stability of the balance of power, on respect for international law, and on the effectiveness of the United Nations. The policy of recognizing revolutionary governments once they are firmly established conforms to international law and American tradition. This policy, it should be noted, is entirely consistent with the Stimson Doctrine of not recognizing the fruits of aggression. In the present troubled state of the world, its reaffirmation by the United States would contribute to peace and justice.

*Were the seeds of today's 'cold war' planted
in Poland during World War II?*

ALLIED WARTIME DIPLOMACY

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By **EDWARD J. ROZEK**, *University of Colorado.*

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American policy towards Israel, in the opinion of this author, has been determined, not only by "domestic considerations or moral values," but by the strong "doubt whether any appeasement of the Arabs short of complete abolition of the sovereign existence of Israel would achieve peace."

The United States and Israel

BY DAVID SIDORSKY

Managing Editor, The Reconstructionist

AMERICAN foreign policy to Israel has oscillated between support of that country through such means as diplomatic recognition and economic aid, and limitations upon that support which have been revealed in such measures as an arms embargo and in the refusal to grant security guarantees. The motivation for the former aspect of United States policy has been a realistic recognition of the actual strength and viability of the state of Israel, her pro-Western bias, the democratic character of her institutions and the strong sentiments of sympathy for that country shared by a significant number of American citizens. The latter aspect of United States policy has stemmed from the desire and need for improved relations with the Arab states, which dominate a region which is crucial both for strategic and oil considerations and to which the state of Israel is anathema.

A striking instance of the pro-Israel policy was the immediate recognition of the Provisional Government of Israel by President Truman in 1948, which made the United States the first government to accord such recognition. An illustration of the opposite tendency was the Eisenhower administration's threat of sanctions in 1956, if Israel did not withdraw from the Sinai peninsula

unconditionally, even without discussion of her admittedly violated rights of passage through the Suez Canal.

However, there is an element of arbitrariness in the selection of these points of oscillation. Truman's action was, to a significant degree, the acceptance of an accomplished fact; it was not coupled with military aid for the invaded and beleaguered state of Israel and came only after the United Nations had failed to act upon the American proposal to delay the partition plan and Israel's independence.

Eisenhower's threat of sanctions was part of a phase of American policy that involved the United States not merely in strained relations with Israel but in a deep break with her closest allies, England and France, in an attempt to restore the moral authority of the Western countries and the prestige of the United Nations in the Middle East; it was followed by discussions with the state of Israel over the preconditions or "assumptions" of a relatively amicable withdrawal. For although the fluctuations of United States policy in the ten years of Israel's existence have been interpreted as demonstrating a difference between Democratic support of, and Republican indifference toward, that country, a strikingly significant fact is the relative consistency of United States policy within a limited arc of oscillation.

This oscillation was characteristic of our foreign policy even prior to the emergence of the state of Israel. Sympathy for a Jewish national home in Palestine had been a tradition in United States policy in the period after World War I. Every president from Wilson on had publicly expressed his sup-

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port for the idea. More important, although the United States had not joined the League of Nations, it was committed by a 1924 treaty with the United Kingdom to an endorsement of the British mandate from the League to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

However, the State Department, as Allen Dulles (who was then responsible for Near Eastern Affairs) has pointed out, was extremely reluctant to accept an American commitment for this area. On the whole, the United States did not interfere with the British exercise of the mandate, including its limitations upon Jewish immigration to Palestine, in consonance with the general lack of American involvement in almost all the countries of the Middle East during this period.

During World War II, partly in response to humanitarian and moral sentiments over the tragedy which followed the closing of the doors of Palestine to refugees from Hitler's Europe, partly because of political pressure from organized Zionist groups, a pro-Zionist Joint Congressional Resolution gained overwhelming expressions of support. It failed to pass because of the intervention of the then Chief of Staff, George Marshall, who warned Congress of the adverse effects such a resolution might have upon United States security interests in the Middle East. Thus, at a relatively early stage in the development of United States policy for Palestine, a concern was manifest about the harm a pro-Zionist policy might have upon American-Arab relations.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, in line with such considerations, is said to have assured Ibn Saud informally that no action would be taken by the United States in Palestine that would be hostile to Arab interests. President Truman wrote Ibn Saud that "this Government has given assurances that it will not take any action which might prove hostile to the Arab people . . ." and asserted that there would be no decision on the Palestine question "without prior consultation with both Arabs and Jews."

(These assurances are obviously capable of diverse interpretations; it can be argued, in good faith, that the Partition proposal was not, if properly implemented, hostile to

the Arab people, and that all Arab states were amply consulted prior to the United States' or the United Nations' adoption of the Partition plan, however opposed they may have been to the final outcome.)

After World War II

At the end of the war, there was a great degree of sympathy on the part of broad segments of the American population for the survivors of the Hitler era, who were living in displaced persons' camps. It was on the basis of a report about these camps by Earl Harrison that President Truman wrote British Prime Minister Attlee, urging the admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine. In making this suggestion, Truman made clear to Attlee, what was indisputably the case, that the United States had no "plan of its own for the solution of the problem of Palestine." However, the Truman proposal involved the United States in a direct clash with the British policy of the stringent limitations upon Jewish immigration.

The result was the formation of a Joint Anglo-American Committee to develop a uniform policy. This committee unanimously endorsed Truman's proposal for immigration, warned that any attempt to create an independent state or states in Palestine would result in civil strife and urged a United Nations' trusteeship to replace the British mandatory authority for Palestine. The United States' very limited involvement in the problem of Palestine was expanded to include a willingness to implement the proposals of the Committee, and a Cabinet Committee with representatives from the Departments of War, State and Treasury, headed by Henry F. Grady, was formed for this purpose.

This Committee met with the British, and the result was a Morrison-Grady plan for autonomous Jewish and Arab cantons in Palestine. It was the divergence between the original Truman proposal and the Morrison-Grady plan which led to the charge, often heard during this crucial formative period of American policy, of a sharp split between the politically pressured President and Congress and the Department of State.

There is a *prima facie* plausibility to the charge in terms of the different personalities, interests and public statements of the diverse groups involved in the creation of our foreign policy. However, much more than routine weight must be lent to the routine denial of the charge, since Truman was characteristically loyal to his secretaries of state, particularly George Marshall.

Stress should be given to the fact that the Truman proposal, while admittedly timed for partisan political advantage, was unanimously endorsed by the Anglo-American Committee. James G. MacDonald, a member of that committee, has reported that Truman's rejection of the Morrison-Grady plan came only after the Committee had unanimously rejected it.

In the absence of any agreed solution, and under the pressures of a worsening situation in Palestine, Britain referred the matter to the United Nations, which appointed a special committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). This committee recommended a partition of Palestine into two states, along the lines of actual population distribution, (except that the uninhabited Negev was to go to the proposed Jewish state), an international trusteeship for Jerusalem, and an economic agreement between the two states.

Ambassador Warren Austin commented in the United Nations that the "United States scrupulously refrained from statements of policy or from acts which might in any way prejudice the work of the Committee." This statement seems fully warranted despite the many times the United States has been "blamed" for partition. It is the case that the United States supported the UNSCOP recommendations strongly in the General Assembly and that this support obviously weighed heavily in the minds of many delegates.

Armed Hostilities

When the Arab opposition to the partition plan expressed itself in armed hostilities in Palestine, the United States defined its policy as a defense of the peace and stability of the region rather than a defense of partition. In consequence, in the absence of measures to guarantee the peaceful implementation of

partition, the United States advanced a temporary trusteeship plan for Palestine. The United States strongly supported those actions of the United Nations that were designed to stop the growing hostilities between the Arab states and the Jews of Palestine, without assuming any direct American involvement or responsibility for the peace of the region.

These measures included the various requests for cease-fire, the appointment of the Mediator, and participation of American personnel among the United Nations' observers. They also included an embargo on arms to the Middle East which was greatly to the disadvantage of the state of Israel, and even the refusal to allow Jewish males of military age to leave the American supervised refugee camps in Europe.

Throughout the period of the Israeli-Arab war from May, 1948, through the spring of 1949, this overriding American concern with an end to hostilities, without any program for a directed territorial solution, was evident. The armistice agreements were negotiated with the various Arab states not on the basis of the original partition boundaries nor the earlier Bernadotte proposals for appeasement of Arabs through lessening the area of the Jewish state, but along the boundary lines of actual military control. This meant that Egypt was in occupation of the Gaza strip, Jordan of much of Palestine and the old city of Jerusalem, and Israel of considerably expanded territory including the new city of Jerusalem.

The armistice agreements thereby directly reflected the military stalemate that formed the basis of the precarious peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It also set up machinery to supervise the truce under the aegis of the United Nations. Above all, whatever lingering irredentist hopes existed among extremist Israeli groups, and whatever deep passions for a "second round" among Arab leaders and populations, the armistice agreements were to be followed by the activity of a Palestine Conciliation Commission, which would negotiate a more durable peace settlement including an agreed solution to the harshest consequence of the conflict, the 800,000 Arab refugees. It is these agreements and the dashing of these expectations that

have supplied the framework within which American policy toward Israel has been formulated.

An Independent Israel

In the nearly ten years of Israel's independent existence, United States foreign policy has been directed toward the normalization of diplomatic relations, the development of programs of economic assistance, and above all, the stabilization of the area through a defense of the *status quo* arrangements of the armistice agreements. These activities have been carried out with a recognition of the need to alleviate the resentment of Arab countries which have adopted the view that the United States is the architect of Israel, and with concern about the Soviet success in penetrating the region through aligning itself with Arab nationalism.

In the background of American efforts toward stabilization of the armistice have been tentative steps toward, and constant vacillation over a program for a more far-reaching solution of the outstanding issues of Arab-Israeli strife at the price of greater United States intervention and the risk of incurring Arab or Israeli wrath.

The American *de facto* recognition of the state of Israel was the first step in the growth of a normal web of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It was an act of some political significance in that it meant the abandonment of an admittedly defunct United States plan for a United Nations trusteeship and represented some degree of faith in, although no commitment to, the survival of that country in the face of an Arab attack.

Even this first diplomatic act between Israel and the United States has been shrouded in controversy since intimates of Truman claim that the decision to recognize the state of Israel was made by the State Department, with the President merely advancing the timing, while the Forrestal Diaries assert that the Department of State learned of the recognition only after the fact. The appointment of James G. MacDonald, who was publicly identified with Zionism, as American representative to the

Provisional Government of Israel was a gesture of friendship which has since been criticized on the grounds that partisan reports would emanate from the American Embassy.

De jure recognition was accorded the state of Israel on January 31, 1949, shortly after the first Israeli election. The timing apparently implies that recognition was granted not merely because Israel was in effective control of the area, but in response to the democratic character of her institutions, a thorny question on the perennial issue of American criteria for diplomatic recognition.

Simultaneously, the United States government recognized the Kingdom of Transjordan. While it is true that in 1949 hopes for an Israeli-Arab peace rested upon negotiations between the apparently amenable King Abdullah of Jordan and Israel, United States action cannot be construed as a step to further that end, but rather as one of many attempts to demonstrate impartiality toward the Arab states and Israel. This effort at impartiality, since it grants an equal status to the existence of Israel, has never succeeded in placating the fundamental Arab antagonism to United States policy to Israel.

The United States strongly supported the admission of Israel to the United Nations in 1949. A series of routine diplomatic arrangements on air travel, and so forth, have been entered into by the two countries. Israel became one of a number of countries which since the war have negotiated a treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the United States which allows for the encouragement of United States investment in Israel. These actions reflect the normal development of United States diplomatic activity in the postwar period with friendly nations.

Considerable diplomatic friction has arisen between the two countries over Israel's transfer of its capital from the provisional seat of Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The United States has refused to transfer its embassy to Jerusalem, and when American Ambassador Lawson presented his credentials to the Israeli president in Jerusalem, the United States took pains to announce that this did not constitute recognition of the Israeli claim to Jerusalem. For one of the many

troubling legacies of the Armistice was that Jerusalem was controlled by Jordanians and Israelis although the original United Nations proposal had suggested internationalization of the city.

The United States has not recently advocated the enactment of such an international trusteeship but it has reiterated that it looks to the United Nations as the legitimate source for action on the future status of Jerusalem. The United States has therefore protested any attempt to preclude a final solution, even though the *status quo* of the armistice has here, unlike so many other border points, been given by both Jordan and Israel the permanence of a relatively tranquil divided city.

Economic Aid

Immediately following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Israel, steps were initiated for economic assistance. The Export Import Bank in 1949 authorized the first of three loans totalling \$135 million which have been used primarily for the improvement of Israeli agriculture. Israel has participated in and received substantial amounts from the various ensuing programs of technical assistance which have characterized United States foreign economic policy in the underdeveloped regions. Under Section 205 of the Mutual Security Act, Israel received substantial amounts of economic assistance for the resettlement of refugees.

In addition to loans and grants, there has been significant training of Israeli personnel in American techniques and industrial practices. Through 1953, the total of all United States assistance to Israel was \$244 million. Since then the annual amounts have declined from \$70 million in 1953, to \$52 million in 1954, and slightly smaller varying annual amounts.

Special mention should be made of the use of American counterpart funds for various cultural programs. The dollar shortage in Israel at one time made it virtually impossible to import substantial quantities of American books at a time when Russian exports were flooding the market. This situation was relieved through use of counterpart

funds. It should also be noted that very little American aid has been available for the purchase of military equipment.

While assistance to Israel is a small part of America's over-all program of economic aid, the scale of those grants has led to charges of favoritism toward Israel. Partly because many countries in the Middle East were still closely bound to the United Kingdom (Iraq, Egypt and Transjordan), partly because the major areas of American influence were those Arab countries which had significant economic agreements with private American companies, the grants of American aid for the Arab countries of the Middle East have been comparatively small. This was true even after the Eisenhower administration had asserted its policy of "impartiality" in the Middle East, and Dulles had urged (after his return from a visit to the area in 1953) that the United States needed to allay the Arab resentment toward it over the creation of the state of Israel. But the criteria of economic assistance must lie in part in the capacity of the country to absorb the assistance productively, and the United States rightly does not seek to create an equality in per capita economic programming between the Arab states and Israel.

The major efforts of American policy have been directed toward maintaining the stability of the region through defense of the Armistice. These efforts have functioned through, A) a joint Anglo-French-American commitment, B) direct relations with Israel, C) the use of the various appropriate agencies of the United Nations. To the extent to which the armistice agreement guarantees the stability and development of the state of Israel, American policy and Israeli interests have coincided. To the significant extent to which these agreements foster a situation which is "neither war nor peace," which allows the indefinite continuation of an economic boycott and of guerilla infiltration from privileged sanctuaries, the American decision to maintain the armistice conditions has involved the United States in a series of policy clashes with Israel.

A) The Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950, was a commitment by England, France and the United States to oppose an arms race in the Middle East and to take action "both

within and outside the U. N. to prevent any violation of armistice lines." The problem of an arms race has been a particularly trying one. As early as 1947, the United States had discontinued licensing any arms shipments to the area. It was however unable to control fully the access of supply. Israel, for instance, bought quantities of arms from Czechoslovakia in 1948. After the armistice agreements, the United Kingdom, which in many instances had treaty obligations with the Arab states, shipped arms to several Arab countries.

In January, 1950, in response to congressional protests about the British arms supplies to the Middle East, Secretary of State Acheson pointed out that it is desirable that the Arab countries receive such arms as they need for legitimate security requirements from "reliable and friendly sources." After the Tripartite Declaration, some rough balance was kept in arms supply of Israel and Arab states, both of which spent a significant portion of their national income on defense. However, the Egyptian-Czech agreement in 1954 completely undercut any regulation of arms flow to the Middle East. The Tripartite Declaration was not used as a basis for action to halt this new supply.

Israel's requests for additional arms to counter the new threat were not met by the United States. Secretary Dulles cited the strong military position of that country *vis à vis* her Arab neighbors and added that her security could not lie in the direction of an arms race. The growing split between the United States and her French and British allies over other issues of Middle East policy made the arms control envisaged in the Tripartite Declaration inapplicable, and in fact, Israel received significant military assistance from France. Importation of Russian weapons into the region has since expanded. United States policy has yet to develop adequate measures to cope with the danger which results in competition for arms supply not merely between Israel and the Arabs, but between quarreling Arab blocs.

B) The United States has not hesitated to apply pressure directly in support of armistice agreements. A striking instance occurred in 1953, when Secretary of State Dulles deferred the release of \$26.5 million

to Israel on the ground that Israel had not respected the decision of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization. The particular issue involved Israel's right to continue a drainage project in the demilitarized zone on the Israeli side of the Syrian border. Israel complied with the United Nations request for delay, and the money was released. The Israeli project has since been completed, but the episode revealed how far the United States was willing to go in support of the armistice.

In the main, the United States has relied upon the Truce Supervisory Organization and the Mixed Armistice Commission of the United Nations to maintain the stability of the borders in Israel. On numerous occasions it has taken the lead in the Security Council, often in joint Anglo-French-United States proposals, to initiate resolutions censuring the party at fault. One of the most important of such resolutions was the censure of Egypt for violation of the armistice provisions by refusing to allow Israeli shipping through the Suez, which was fruitless. Alternatively, in 1953, the Israeli policy of retaliation to Arab infiltration resulted in the death of many Arab civilians at Qibya. The United States moved a strong resolution of censure which was later amended to include a plea for an over-all solution of border instability and a recognition of provocation.

However, by far the most striking use of United Nations machinery occurred in the Suez crisis. The complete breakdown of policy agreement among the United States, England and France made any application of the Tripartite Declaration or Security Council resolution impossible. The result was a motion in the General Assembly to set up a United Nations Emergency Force and to demand an Israeli withdrawal. This withdrawal was effected. The Israeli hope to use the "situation of strength" to force a peace negotiation here met the stern American insistence to restore the *status quo ante*. The situation was changed in Israel's favor, in that the United Nations Emergency Force now supervises the Gaza strip which lessens the threat of guerilla infiltration, and that, partly with American support, passage of merchant ships with Israeli-bound cargo

through the Suez and through the straits of Tiran has been achieved.

In recent years, Soviet successes in both Egypt and Syria have opened the spectre of a new source of instability in the Middle East. The administration response in the Eisenhower Doctrine which guarantees the territorial integrity of Middle Eastern countries is admittedly incomplete. For example, there is the danger of a renewal of hostilities with the Soviets closely aligned to an Arab state. The Israeli government has requested security agreements, either with NATO or the United States. The United States has been reluctant to undertake any formal commitment in this regard.

A still, small but constant voice in American policy has been raised repeatedly over the years in announcing this country's willingness to underwrite any peace settlement if the Arabs and Israelis will negotiate it. The United States, with Turkey and France, accepted membership in the Palestine Conciliation Commission. Indeed, the first American representative on the Commission, Mr. Mark Ethridge, was initially optimistic on the Commission's task of aiding the evolution of the armistice into a permanent peace agreement.

Secretary of State Acheson declared, in 1949, that "If the Near Eastern nations put aside their differences the United States stands ready to help." A direct line of similar statements may be traced up to and including Mr. Dulles' assertion that the United States would be willing to enter into security guarantees with the Middle Eastern nations, subsequent to a settlement of their outstanding difficulties. All of these statements declare that the responsibility for a peace agreement lies primarily upon the disputing nations and offer to help in the solution if the parties to the dispute should desire.

In some instances, the United States has not merely expressed willingness but has offered advice. Under-Secretary Byroade urged Israel to seek integration into the Middle Eastern region. He urged the Arabs to accept the state of Israel as an accomplished fact and chided, "... You are deliberately attempting to maintain a state of affairs delicately suspended between peace

and war, while at present desiring neither. This is a most dangerous policy. . . ." Although the United States has been eager to consolidate a negotiated peace she has steadfastly refused to undertake to exert the type of pressure which is required to force the beginning of serious negotiations.

Many competent students of the Arab-Israeli conflict agree that the outstanding road block to a solution of the dispute is the unresolved problem of the Palestinian refugees. The United States, which has borne the bulk of the maintenance costs of the refugee camps, has reiterated its willingness to assist financially programs of rehabilitation or repatriation. The initial Economic Survey Mission of the United Nations headed by Gordon Clapp in 1949 suggested various programs for resettlement of the refugees but pointed out that these required prior political decisions which went beyond the scope of an economic survey.

The American policy is that the refugees are to be either resettled or repatriated with the choice of alternatives to be given to the individual refugee. The most ambitious American proposal, the Johnson Jordan Valley plan, anticipated significant Arab settlement. Here also a direct line may be traced from the early statements of American willingness to help in solution of the problem to Secretary of State Dulles' later explicit offer of a loan to Israel to compensate the Arabs in their resettlement.

All of these United States programs presuppose either Israeli acceptance of repatriation or Arab acceptance of rehabilitation, and have not been implemented because this antecedent condition has not been met. Despite vague warnings of its inability indefinitely to bear the burden of Arab refugees, the United States has not intervened to pressure the parties involved into a resolution of the problem.

A vexing question in regard to American-Israel relations has been the issue of domestic political pressure upon the formation of that policy, whether by Zionists for pro-Israel aims, or by oil companies for pro-Arab aims. It may be noted that it is permissible and perhaps mandatory for a democratic foreign policy to reflect the interests and sympathies of its citizens, and

that the fact of great profits in Arabian oil does not lessen the importance of access to oil resources in developing a policy.

The situation is complicated by the obvious success of Jewish groups in obtaining statements from important spokesmen of both political parties and party planks which endorsed a pro-Israel policy. However, the situation was similar in the United Kingdom where both parties endorsed Zionist aims over a much longer period without substantially affecting the anti-Zionist basis of later British policy in Palestine.

This review has tried to show that American policy supports Israel in that it accepts the fact of its existence, supplies economic assistance and promotes the integrity of the armistice borders; and clashes with Israel over the important questions of supply of arms, retaliation to guerilla infiltrations and the status of Jerusalem. This does not support a portrait of an American policy distorted by domestic political concerns or one that is sharply out of line with a fair appraisal of the national interest.

The most intriguing question in an examination of this country's foreign policy to Israel is an evaluation of the adequacy of the alternatives to that policy. For, if the diminution of Britain's and France's role in the Middle East made the growth of this country's involvement in the area inevitable, then, critics have charged that it was a fundamental error not to intervene directly and forcefully to stabilize the region. Pro-Arab critics have charged that pressure upon Israel, particularly economic pressure including the disallowing of philanthropic exports to that country, could have resulted in the repatriation of the Arab refugees and a restoration of the partition boundaries. The United States has been reluctant to apply such pressure, however, not merely because of domestic considerations or moral values but because of doubts of the effectiveness of such pressure against the strong-fibred Israeli state, and more significantly, because of doubt whether any appeasement of the Arabs short of complete abolition of the sovereign existence of Israel would achieve peace.

Alternatively, pro-Israel critics have argued that in the long run it is clear that

the only basis for solution lies in rehabilitation of the overwhelming majority of the refugees and Arab acceptance of the existence of the state of Israel. Clearly therefore it should be the function of American policy to assist the emergence of this solution by all means at its disposal. These could include security guarantees to Israel, allowing the Israeli situation of strength to force direct negotiations, or strong promises of economic assistance to those countries which rehabilitate refugees and discriminatory economic programs against any blocking of a settlement.

It has been argued against any such undertaking however that if the American policy which has sought impartiality between the Arab and Israeli camps has incurred such deep Arab resentment and estrangement, any policy which sought to force the Arabs to make peace with Israel could only alienate them irreparably from Western influence.

However, any interpretation of our present policy as a pragmatic compromise between two extremes would do well to recall the classic experiment in rat psychology wherein a rat conditioned to both jump and stand still by different stimuli, with simultaneous application of the stimuli, chooses to jump half-heartedly with disastrous consequences. For the consequences of American acceptance of the *status quo* has been the pervasive instability of the area, which contributes to making it a fertile area for Soviet penetration. The failure to come to grips with refugee resettlement is directly related to the present anti-Western agitation in Jordan which renders that country so precarious an ally. Further, the unresolved status of Arab-Israel relations has mesmerized Arab public opinion around the question of Israel to the neglect of the Soviet threat.

Emotional concern with Israel above all has blocked the Arab peoples in their transition to the industrial and democratic practices of the Western world, a transition upon which the long-range future of American-Arab relations rests. Perhaps most important is the fact that the long delay in decisive action through acceptance of a chronically unstable situation has already lessened American freedom of action.

"The United States and its allies now possess a magnificent opportunity in Poland. Anti-Russian feeling there has an ancient and honorable tradition, and pro-Western feeling has roots which have become deeper and stronger in the last ten years." In addition, according to this observer, "Poland is not only open to Western ideas to a degree which any observer would have thought impossible two years ago, but it is also an avenue for ideas into the Soviet Union and the rest of the Soviet orbit."

American Policy in Poland

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THE decade after the Second World War was a very bleak one for the United States as far as its policy towards Poland and other states of East Central Europe were concerned. World War II ended with Soviet forces in control of East Central Europe, which, with the collapse of German power, constituted a vacuum into which Soviet power flowed. While the Russians during the years after the war tightened their controls and devoted massive energy to reshaping the economies and political systems of the countries of East Central Europe, the United States was limited to ineffective protests and demonstrations of helpless anguish. American political warfare conducted against Soviet control of these areas was not notably effective, and even the author of the containment policy in the summer of 1956 said that there is "a finality for

better or worse about what has happened in Eastern Europe."

The containment policy, which was the foundation of the American approach to Poland and its neighbors after 1947, was based on the assumption that the United States, even though it had enormous economic and military power, faced serious limitations in any struggle with the Soviet Union. Given that limited power and the tremendous new responsibilities the American people had to accept, the doctrine of containment emphasized that the United States should increase its military strength and indicate clearly its determination to contain Soviet power. The policy was designed to produce strains within the Soviet Union which would bring about changes operating to the advantage of the Free World.

Thus, American policy rested upon the increase of American economic and military power, firmness and determination in American policy towards the Soviet Union, the spread of American military power to overseas areas, provision of military assistance to other countries threatened by the Soviet Union, creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and, ultimately, the establishment of other alliance systems. In addition to these powerful foundations, the American government and American people sought to promote the economic and political recovery of Western Europe as a step toward the reestablishment of a free Europe. Moreover, Americans and Europeans together developed the concept of a federal

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Western Europe as the basis for new European unity.

Finally, the doctrine of containment emphasized that the United States and its friends in the Free World should so conduct themselves as to preserve the spiritual values of civilized society, to expose the myths of communism, to encourage hope among the captive peoples, and to promote the flowering of the seeds of decay within the Communist system.

Containment has remained a basic American policy since 1947. However, there was a brief political and verbal flirtation with a concept known as liberation in 1952 and 1953. This concept had no real significance in American policy, but its brief popularity led many of our friends, and probably of our enemies, also, to fear that the United States might use force to free the states and peoples of East Central Europe, thereby launching a third world war.

Revolts

Most informed Americans by 1956 believed there was little we could do either to liberate the satellite states and peoples or to ease their position within the Soviet system. Thus, the 1956 revolution in Poland came as an enormous surprise to outside observers. This revolution, which was followed by the unsuccessful revolt in Hungary, was a Soviet disaster of such magnitude that we probably still do not comprehend the opportunity we now possess. It is ironic that the immense weakening of the Soviet system in East Central Europe has now been obscured by enormous Soviet successes in launching missiles, in apparently seizing the leadership from the United States in certain fields of military technology, and in competing with us among the people of the underdeveloped countries.

However, when one compares Nazi control of the continent of Europe in 1940 with the Soviet position in East Central Europe in 1958, or when one compares Soviet rule in 1955 with that in 1958, one can see that enormous changes have taken place and that extraordinary gaps in the Iron Curtain have been created through which ideas are now flowing almost freely. These changes began

to develop in the fall of 1956, particularly after the combination of Western recovery, Soviet repression and relaxation, and Polish skill and bravery brought on the Polish revolution.

This revolution, probably the only successful revolution the Poles have ever managed, began with riots in Poznan in June and was concluded by a palace personnel and policy change in October and November, 1956. Drastic change, carried out in a period of domestic and international tension, brought Gomulka back from prison into the Central Committee and into a position as Secretary of the Party. With this, and with the astonishing success of the Poles in standing up to Soviet menaces and pressures, a number of other advances were made which reduced considerably the effectiveness and degree of Soviet control over Poland. The first steps included the removal of many Soviet officers and advisors, notably Marshal Rokossovsky as Minister of Defense; the elimination of many Stalinists from important positions in the Party and the government; the release of Cardinal Wysinski from prison and the almost immediate negotiation of a treaty between the Polish state and the Catholic Church. This freed the Church from many controls and allowed the introduction again of religious education. Finally, in Moscow on November 18, 1956, an agreement was signed between the Polish and Russian governments which recognized the full independence and integrity of Poland, promised that the Soviet Union would not interfere in Polish domestic affairs, and began the reorganization of all the political and economic arrangements between Poland and Russia.

Poland's Status Today

The present position of Poland is fairly difficult to define. On the one hand, Poland is still clearly within the control of the Communist party, although the character of that party has changed considerably in the last two years; the Polish government is still loyal to the Soviet Union, and bases its policies upon full cooperation with its Eastern "neighbor"; and Poland is a member of the Warsaw Pact. On the other

hand, Poland has attained a considerable degree of independence from the Soviet Union and has demonstrated to the Russians and to the rest of the world that the Poles have substantial power and determination for defending the position they have attained.

The changes can best be demonstrated by looking briefly at some domestic policies. Thus, the Roman Catholic Church has been freed from most Communist pressures and is now allowed to provide religious instruction in all the Polish schools. The collective farms have been abolished almost in their entirety, with the Polish landscape consequently being vastly different from that of the Soviet Union. The monopoly of the State in domestic trade has been smashed, and most Polish cities are now dotted by little stores of the variety one meets in free states. Most important, perhaps, is the fact that Poland now has access to information from the rest of the world. One can buy Western newspapers, Western magazines, and Western books in Polish cities. Poles can now travel freely to Western Europe, to the United States, and to other parts of the world.¹ In other words, on many levels of domestic policy, Poland resembles to some degree a free society.

Poland, of course, lives under the shadow of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Poles are convinced that they cannot and will not return to the situation before October, 1956. They now have control of their own army. In addition, they will fight to retain the liberties they have gained and the evils they have overcome; the Russians know that as well. Finally, the Poles are convinced that the Russians could not endure a second Hungary, because of the impact this would have upon the rest of the world and because such an operation might launch a third world war.

However, the Polish government and people face enormous and delicate problems. They must first balance successfully between the Soviet Union and the free world. The second problem, which is almost as serious, involves the economic crisis which has affected Poland for several years because of the long years of Communist control, because of the Communist policy of massive industrialization, and because of

the exploitation of the Polish economy by the Soviet Union.

Contribution from the West

The United States and the other states of the free world contributed significantly to the Polish Revolution. Indeed, the existence of a powerful and united West made the Polish action possible. Moreover, the recovery of Western Europe and the development of a federal European concept created an ideological framework. These acted as magnets, drawing Poland free from the Soviet Union.

Another important contribution from the West has been the aid provided Tito's Yugoslavia since 1948. The massive assistance to a state governed by Communists, but by Communists not under Soviet control, has enabled the world to see that it is possible for people to work their way free from the Soviet Union and at the same time to receive assistance from non-Communist states. The manner in which this aid has been managed has been of particular importance, because neither the United States nor the states of Western Europe have attempted to influence Yugoslav domestic or foreign policy. The Poles realize, as most other peoples realize, that aid to Tito was a difficult operation for non-Communist states, because of the domestic problems that such assistance created in each state and because of the perpetual uncertainty concerning the future of Yugoslavia and of Yugoslav policy.

The United States and other Western states contributed also by their general conduct. In other words, the continuance of American prosperity, the maintenance of strong military forces, the demonstrations given of firmness and determination, and the good sense which the non-Communist states generally have shown over the last decade have been of considerable assistance.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the success of containment led to new Soviet policies. In other words, stopped by the containment program, the Soviet leaders have turned for advancement to other areas, such as the underdeveloped parts of the

¹ See page 188 of this issue.

world. The Soviet Union in its new policy of economic assistance has in effect borrowed the Marshall Plan and Point Four for those underdeveloped countries not under Soviet control. The refurbishing of the doctrine of peaceful co-existence is also a reflection of Western success. Finally, the Soviet effort to relax international tensions and, above all, the de-Stalinization program and the appeal to Tito, were caused by Western successes. These Soviet actions created a position and atmosphere in which the Polish Revolution took place.

The United States and its allies now possess a magnificent opportunity in Poland. Anti-Russian feeling there has an ancient and honorable tradition, and pro-Western feeling has roots which have become deeper and stronger in the last ten years. In addition, the October Revolution and the events since that time have demonstrated the weakness of communism, which hardly succeeded in scratching the surface of Polish society. Moreover, the freedom, frankness, moderation and confidence with which the Poles now live and act provide opportunities for the free world. Finally, and perhaps most important, in the last several years an intellectual break-through has occurred in Poland. "The Poles have gone through Marxism-Leninism and they are now living on the other side." They are searching for a new philosophy, a philosophy which will reflect their own national traditions and experience, the effects of the last ten or twelve years, and the policies and ideals of the rest of the world in the last decade in particular.

The "revolution of rising expectations" has apparently not affected the Polish people. In other words, they are little interested in the material things of life, except for those which are necessary for continued survival. Instead, they place a higher emphasis than most peoples do upon the political virtues and upon spiritual values.

This development is particularly important because the Poles have a powerful thirst for knowledge concerning the rest of the world and live in a kind of spiritual or intellectual vacuum, which is being rapidly filled by the Catholic Church and Catholicism, which have always held a very firm place in Poland. The eagerness of the Poles

to obtain the books of which they have been deprived for 20 years is most remarkable, and their eagerness to resume contacts with scholars in the Western world is striking, particularly when compared with the formal interest expressed by Soviet citizens.

Aid to Poland

The United States and Western peoples in general firmly applauded the success of the Poles in reducing and restricting the Soviet bonds. Popular Western interest and support have had important effects upon Polish policy, and the Poles' knowledge that they are not alone has been a great source of aid. In addition, in the summer of 1957, the American government provided \$95 million worth of aid to help the Polish people in their severe economic crisis and to reduce their dependence upon the Russians. These funds were provided only after long and delicate negotiations, and they were much less than the Poles had hoped to receive. While the Poles were to some degree disappointed, the negotiations were carried on in such a way that the Poles were convinced of our eagerness to help them without enforcing political obligations. Continued American economic assistance will increase Polish confidence and reduce Polish dependence upon the Soviet Union.

Perhaps even more important than American government assistance has been the assistance provided by American individuals, universities and private foundations. Thousands of Americans of Polish descent have visited Poland in the last two years, renewing profound ties and demonstrating in a concrete sense their conviction that Poland will return to the Western community of nations. Private individuals have shipped thousands of dollars worth of food, clothing, medicine and books to relatives and friends. Organizations such as the National Catholic Welfare Council have shipped millions of dollars worth of food and clothing, and universities in the United States have provided books and fellowships.

In April, 1957, the Ford Foundation announced that its International Affairs Division had a sum of \$500,000 for helping to rebuild the libraries of Polish educational

institutions and to provide fellowships for Polish scholars and teachers to visit Western European and American institutions. Approximately 80 Poles have already received fellowships and visited countries in Western Europe or the United States, and the eight Polish universities are now dividing \$80,000 made available to them for helping to rebuild their library collections.

In addition, the Rockefeller Foundation in 1957 set aside a fund of \$475,000. Of this, \$300,000 is being used for the purchase of scientific equipment for six Polish universities, for the medical and agricultural schools, for various institutions in the Ministry of Health, and for research institutions and laboratories of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Another \$175,000 is being used for fellowships to Polish teachers and scholars and for travel grants. In other words, these two American Foundations have provided almost a million dollars to assist the libraries and laboratories of Poland and to make it possible for Polish intellectuals to resume their contacts with the Western World.

Poland is not only open to Western ideas to a degree which any observer would have thought impossible two years ago, but it is also an avenue for ideas into the Soviet Union and the rest of the Soviet orbit. Thousands of Poles each year visit the Soviet Union and its other neighbor countries, and thousands of Russians, Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, Rumanians, Bulgarians and Germans visit Poland. Thus, ideas inserted into the Polish scene are almost automatically passed along to other people living under Communist rule.


The United States and the other states of the free world therefore have an immense opportunity to forward the processes of peaceful change within the Soviet bloc by pouring into Poland books, journals and other kinds of materials for use by the Poles in reshaping their philosophy and for ef-

fecting changes among other peoples living under Soviet rule.

This represents the largest gap in the Iron Curtain that the Soviet rulers have allowed since the 1920's. Ideas are now flowing throughout the higher levels of the Soviet system, gradually and slowly undermining the effectiveness of Communist rule and creating new concepts and attitudes which will spark slow, but very profound changes. In other words, the United States government and the American people should clearly take advantage of this extraordinary opportunity, which allows ideas to compete freely in the Polish market.

The principal grip which the Soviet Union has upon Poland is military, and the second major factor is the intense Polish fear of Germany. If this fear were removed, Polish policy would inevitably be reoriented. The establishment of close relations between Western Germany and Poland and the initiation of Poland therefore into the Western community would do more than any other step to weaken the Soviet controls over Poland, particularly if in private negotiations the government of Western Germany could begin discussions with the Poles concerning the Oder-Neisse frontier. Such policies would eliminate, or sharply reduce, Polish fear of Western Germany and thereby undermine Soviet influence in Poland.

In summary, then, the United States and its friends in the free world have an immense opportunity to speed peaceful change throughout the Soviet empire by providing economic assistance to Poland, by helping to bring Poland and Western Germany into closer relations, and, above all, by taking advantage of the free market in ideas in Poland. The United States should facilitate exchanges between Polish and Western scholars and students and pour information and ideas into Poland and thereby into the Soviet Union itself.



"The world of 1958 consists of 2.75 billion people. Approximately one billion are living under the Sino-Soviet Communist dictatorship. 1.75 billion are not under this dictatorship, and these are the people of the free world. There are nearly 175 million people in the United States. The rest . . . represent the balance of power in our world today."—C. Douglas Dillon, *Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs*, January 27, 1958.

Received At Our Desk

American Foreign Policy . . .

BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY: MYTH

OR REALITY? BY CECIL V. CRABB, JR.

(New York: Row, Peterson and Company, 1957. 279 pages with bibliography and index, \$4.50.)

"For over a decade the United States has attempted to conduct its foreign affairs upon a 'bipartisan' basis." The author seriously questions the wisdom of this policy, because, among other reasons, it is at variance with some of the assumptions upon which democratic government and its inevitable handmaiden—a vital and dynamic party system—are founded. While the advantages to be gained have been widely recognized, the harmful consequences seem to have escaped the attention both of the general public and of commentators on the American politico-governmental system.

Examined first are "the historical reasons why the unprecedented emphasis upon the bipartisan principle emerged during the period of the Second World War." Next, are presented five case studies of important developments in American post-war foreign relations in which efforts were made to follow this principle. These center around the genesis of containment, the defense of Western Europe, Nationalist China, and the ferment in the Middle East.

The last three chapters are devoted to an "analysis of the nature of the bipartisan concept and to an exploration of its implications for the American politico-governmental system." Two of these chapters treat the factors that will largely determine whether bipartisan cooperation is achieved. The last chapter evaluates the assets and the liabilities of bipartisan foreign policy.

This study reveals the intricate role played by party politics in the conduct of our foreign policy. But more than that, it raises a number of pertinent questions

which merit consideration on the part of the American public.

ISOLATION AND SECURITY: IDEAS AND

INTERESTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. EDITED BY ALEXANDER DECONDE. (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1957. 204 pages with bibliography and index, \$4.50.)

In the summer of 1956, seven scholars in the disciplines of economics, history, and political science met for eight weeks at Duke University "to examine the nature and the place of the doctrines of isolation and of collective security in American diplomacy during the twentieth century." The seven thoughtful essays contained in this book are the result.

The basic subject with which the seminar was concerned was "the conflict, real or supposed, between isolation and collective security." The book does not pretend to be exhaustive but it does serve to clarify the structure of the problems involved. "It goes beyond the subject of diplomatic notewriting, beyond such generalities as nationalism and imperialism, to dissect, if this may be, the ideas from which foreign policy springs and to explore the philosophies that policy-makers have espoused."

The titles of the essays and their authors are as follows: "On Twentieth-Century Isolationism," by Alexander DeConde; "The United States and 'Collective Security'; Notes on the History of an Idea," by Richard N. Current; "Military Force and American Policy, 1919-1939," by J. Chalmers Vinson; "The Peace Movement," by Robert H. Ferrell; "Cordell Hull and the Defense of the Trade Agreements Program, 1934-1940," by William R. Allen; "Ambiguity and Ambivalence in Ideas of National Interest in Asia," by William L. Neumann; "Isolationism and Collective Security: The Uses and Limits of Two

Theories of International Relations," by Kenneth W. Thompson.

These essays serve to "bring into clearer perspective the ideas we have used and misused and the conclusions we have drawn from them." The more serious reader will find them stimulating, challenging and thought-provoking.

WILSON'S FOREIGN POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE. EDITED BY EDWARD H. BUEHRIG. (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1957. 176 pages, \$4.50.)

This book consists of five articles on Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy as viewed retrospectively from the vantage point of mid-twentieth century. They were originally given as lectures at Indiana University's celebration of the Woodrow Wilson Centennial. The articles vary markedly in content, outlook, and treatment of the subject.

In the first article, Charles Seymour examines the role and influence of Colonel House as personal friend and aide to President Wilson. In the author's opinion, "Wilson's basic principles were by no means inspired by the Colonel." In "Woodrow Wilson and Collective Security," Edward H. Buehrig seeks to answer by what path Mr. Wilson arrived at the policy of collective security and what tactics he used in looking to its achievement.

Harold M. Vinacke's "Woodrow Wilson's Far Eastern Policy" is primarily concerned with problems and policy relating to China. The fourth article, by Samuel Flagg Bemis, critically discusses Wilson's attitude toward Latin America and relations with the republics of the Western Hemisphere before and during the First World War. Mr. Bemis states that though Wilson in his day failed in his Latin American policy, his great moral vision lives on.

Sir Llewellyn Woodward describes the views, not always flattering, taken of Mr. Wilson in retrospect by English historians. The author notes that "... the aims of Western powers for an effective settlement after this second war were in essentials a revival of Mr. Wilson's leading ideas."

THE AMERICAN IDEA OF MISSION: CONCEPTS OF NATIONAL PURPOSE AND DESTINY. BY EDWARD MCNALL BURNS. (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1957. 385 pages with bibliography and index, illustrated, \$9.00.)

"Perhaps no theme has ever dominated the minds of the leaders of this nation to the same extent as the idea that America occupies a unique place and has a special destiny among the nations of the earth."

Professor Burns has made an extensive study of this theme from the days of George Washington to the present. Relying heavily on numerous carefully selected quotations he reveals, by a topical approach, what many of the more notable Americans have thought about such matters as democracy, freedom, equality, individualism, race, religion, war, empire-building, and conservation. The thoughts and opinions are varied and often conflicting.

In his concluding chapter, a summation of the various concepts, he notes the frequent division between the ideal and the actual and the changes which have evolved in our interpretation of these ideals. He states that "belief in the uniqueness of the American nation and the consummate value of its mission seems almost as strong in our own time as in any other period of our history." "Purged of its dross of conceit and illusion, the mission of America remains one of the noblest expressions of idealism that any nation has embraced. What it needs most of all is more wisdom and tolerance in carrying it out. Intelligently applied, its elements of liberty, equality, democracy, and peace are the prime essentials to give substance of hope to a tortured humanity."

THE AMERICAN CAUSE. BY RUSSELL KIRK. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957. 172 pages with bibliography, \$8.50.)

Many Americans lack any clear understanding of their own nation's first principles. This was painfully demonstrated during the Korean War when it was found that "American troops were easy subjects for Communist indoctrination, because

most American soldiers were ignorant of the principles and rights and political forms they were supposed to defend. . . ."

This little book is an elementary statement of the moral and social principles which the American nation upholds in its times of troubles. It discusses first the need for principles and examines the nature of man, the church and the state, and the foundations of our federal republic. Next, the basis of our free economy and its meaning to Americans are stated in their simplest terms. The author then examines communism and its meaning to man. He concludes by offering answers to Communist charges against the United States and by pointing out the Communists' own record of misdeeds and injustices.

Intended for the general reader, civilian or military, the book does not pretend to be all-inclusive but aims to serve as "a little window opening on the beliefs and customs and history and practices in America which constitute America's claim to civilization and America's source of well-being."

History and Politics . . .

THE POLITICS OF ISRAEL: THE FIRST DECADE OF STATEHOOD. BY MARVER H. BERNSTEIN. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957. 360 pages with appendix, index, and maps, \$6.00.)

Professor Bernstein has made a comprehensive study of the government of Israel from its earliest beginnings to the present. He first examines the historical foundations of statehood and the evolution of the constitutional framework.

Next, he critically describes and analyzes the political parties and the electoral process, and the role and the functioning of the legislative, judiciary and executive branches of the government as they have developed. Special attention is given to the administrative setting and the civil service system. The economic development of the state is also explored and there is a discussion of the state's struggle for economic independence and the

problems involved concerning budgeting and financing. One chapter is devoted to a study of local government and another to the development of welfare activities, for "the nation is firmly committed to the philosophy of the welfare state." The author concludes that "Israel's record for the first decade of statehood rests in the main upon its demonstrated capacity to survive as a free society and to develop a substantial measure of stability in its democratic institutions."

The author's concise, logical, objective and direct treatment of his subject makes this book one that is easily comprehended as well as informative. His lucid, flowing style provides facile and enjoyable reading. He discusses the Arab-Israel conflict only as it influences his primary concern—the internal political, administrative and economic development of Israel.

THE UNITED STATES IN GERMANY: 1944-1955. BY HAROLD ZINK. (New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1957. 374 pages with bibliography and index, illustrated, \$7.50.)

This book offers a comprehensive study of the American experience in Germany from 1945 through 1955 by Harold Zink, former Chief Historian of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany. Though based on a great array of authoritative material, the book's nontechnical character makes it one that will appeal to the general reader. Also, certain of its observations and conclusions may be of interest to the specialist.

Gradually, by the step-by-step progression of policies, the occupation arrived at a workable solution of advancing from military to civil rule and eventually to a free German nation. Dr. Zink describes America's role in the construction of the new German government, United States participation in economic reconstruction, its attempts in the educational field, and its numerous and widespread activities in the social spheres such as the exchanges program, and youth and women's organizations.

—By Margaret D. Bishop

Current Documents

The State of the Union Message

The State of the Union message, as delivered by President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Congress of the United States on January 9, 1958, is reprinted in full:

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Eighty-fifth Congress, my fellow-citizens:

It is again my high privilege to extend personal greetings to the members of the Eighty-fifth Congress.

Moreover, Mrs. Eisenhower would like to join me in wishing for you and your families a bright and prosperous New Year.

And because of the felicitous circumstance that the birth anniversaries of our Speaker and our Vice President occur this same week, I know all of us will join in saying to both: Happy Birthday!

Now, my friends, honest men differ in their appraisal of America's material and intellectual strength, and the dangers that today confront us. But all know that these dangers are real.

The purpose of this message is to outline the measures that can give the American people a confidence—just as real—in their own security.

I am not here to justify the past, to gloss over the problems of the present, or propose any easy solutions for the future.

I am here to state what I believe to be right, what I believe to be wrong; and to propose action for correcting what I think wrong!

I

There are two tasks confronting us that so far outweigh all others that I shall devote this year's message entirely to them.

The first is to ensure our safety through strength.

As to our strength, I have repeatedly voiced this conviction: we now have a broadly based and efficient defensive strength, including a great deterrent power,

which is, for the present, our best guarantee against war; but unless we act wisely and promptly, we could lose that capacity to deter attack or defend ourselves.

My profoundest conviction is that the American people will say, as one man: No matter what the exertions or sacrifices, we shall maintain that necessary strength!

But we could make no more tragic mistake than merely to concentrate on military strength.

For if we did only this, the future would hold nothing for the world but an Age of Terror.

And so our second task is to do the constructive work of building a genuine peace. We must never become so preoccupied with our desire for military strength that we neglect those areas of economic development, trade, diplomacy, education, ideas and principles where the foundation of real peace must be laid.

II

Now, the threat to our safety, and to the hope of a peaceful world, is simply stated. It is Communist imperialism.

This threat is not something imagined by critics of the Soviets. Soviet spokesmen, from the beginning, have publicly and frequently declared their aim to expand their power, one way or another, throughout the world.

This threat has become increasingly serious as this expansionist aim has been reinforced by an advancing industrial, military and scientific establishment.

But what makes the Soviet threat unique in history is its all-inclusiveness. Every human activity is pressed into service as

a weapon of expansion. Trade, economic development, military power, arts, science, education, the whole world of ideas—all are harnessed to this same chariot of expansion.

The Soviets are, in short, waging total cold war.

The only answer to a regime that wages total cold war is to wage total peace.

This means bringing to bear every asset of our personal and national lives upon the task of building the conditions in which security and peace can grow.

III

Among our assets, let us first briefly glance at our military power.

Military power serves the cause of security by making prohibitive the cost of any aggressive attack.

It serves the cause of peace by holding up a shield behind which the patient constructive work of peace can go on.

But it can serve neither cause if we make either of two mistakes. The one would be to overestimate our strength, and thus neglect crucially important actions in the period just ahead. The other would be to underestimate our strength. Thereby we might be tempted to become irresolute in our foreign relations, to dishearten our friends, and to lose our national poise and perspective in approaching the complex problems ahead.

Any orderly balance-sheet of military strength must be in two parts. The first is the position of today. The second is the position in the period ahead.

As of today: Our defensive shield comprehends a vast complex of ground, sea and air units, superbly equipped and strategically deployed around the world. The most powerful deterrent to war in the world today lies in the retaliatory power of our Strategic Air Command and the aircraft of our Navy. They present to any potential attacker who would unleash war upon the world the prospect of virtual annihilation of his own country.

Even if we assume a surprise attack on our bases, with a marked reduction in our striking power, our bombers would immediately be on their way in sufficient strength

to accomplish this mission of retaliation. Every informed Government knows this. It is no secret.

Since the Korean armistice, the American people have spent \$225 billion in maintaining and strengthening this over-all defensive shield.

This is the position as of today.

Now as to the period ahead: Every part of our military establishment must and will be equipped to do its defensive job with the most modern methods and weapons. But it is particularly important that we make a candid estimate of the effect of long-range ballistic missiles on the present deterrent power I have described.

At this moment the consensus of opinion is that we are probably somewhat behind the Soviets in some areas of long-range ballistic missile development. But it is my conviction, based on close study of all relevant intelligence, with the best information that scientists can bring to me, that if we make the necessary effort we will have the missiles, in the needed quantity and in time, to sustain and to strengthen the deterrent power of our increasingly efficient bombers. One encouraging fact evidencing this ability is the rate of progress we have achieved since we began to concentrate on these missiles.

The intermediate ballistic missiles, Thor and Jupiter, have already been ordered into production. The parallel progress in the intercontinental ballistic missile effort will be advanced by new plans for acceleration. The development of the submarine-based Polaris missile system has progressed so well that its future procurement schedules are being moved forward markedly.

When it is remembered that our country has concentrated on the development of ballistic missiles for only about a third as long as the Soviet, these achievements show a rate of progress that speaks for itself. Only a brief time back we were spending at the rate of only about one million dollars a year on long-range ballistic missiles. In 1957 we spent more than one billion dollars on the Atlas, Titan, Thor, Jupiter and Polaris programs alone.

This is a rate of increase of 1,000 times.

But I repeat, gratifying though this rate of progress is, we must still do more!

Our real problem, then, is not our strength today; it is rather the vital necessity of action today to insure our strength tomorrow.

What I have just said applies to our strength as a single country. We are not alone. I have returned from the recent NATO meeting with renewed conviction that, because we are a part of a world-wide community of free and peaceful nations, our own security is immeasurably increased.

By contrast, the Soviet Union has surrounded itself with captive and sullen nations. Like a crack in the crust of an uneasily sleeping volcano, the Hungarian uprising revealed the depth and intensity of the patriotic longing for liberty that still burns within these countries.

The world thinks of us as a country which is strong, but which will never start a war. The world also thinks of us as a land which has never enslaved anyone and which is animated by human ideals. This friendship, based on common ideals, is one of our greatest sources of strength.

It cements into a cohesive security arrangement the aggregate of the spiritual, military and economic strength of all those nations which, with us, are allied by treaties and by agreements.

Up to this point, I have talked almost solely about our military strength to deter a possible future war.

I now want to talk about the strength we need to win a different kind of war—one that has already been launched against us.

It is the intensive economic offensive that has been mounted by the Communist imperialists against free nations.

The Communist imperialist regimes have for some time been largely frustrated in their attempts at expansion based directly on force. As a result, they have begun to concentrate heavily on economic penetration, particularly of newly developing countries, as a preliminary to political domination.

This non-military drive, if underestimated, could defeat the free world regardless of our military strength. The danger is the greater precisely because many of us fail or refuse to recognize it. Thus, some people may be tempted to finance our extra

military effort by cutting economic assistance. But at the very time when the economic threat is assuming menacing proportions, to fail to strengthen our own effort would be nothing less than reckless folly!

Admittedly, most of us did not anticipate the intensity of the psychological impact upon the world of the launching of the first earth satellite. Let us not make the same kind of mistake in another field, by failing to anticipate the much more serious impact of the Soviet economic offensive.

Now, as with our military potential, our economic assets are more than equal to the task. Our independent farmers produce an abundance of food and fiber. Our free workers are versatile, intelligent, and hard-working. Our business men are imaginative and resourceful. The productivity, the adaptability of the American economy is the solid foundation-stone of our whole security structure.

We have just concluded another prosperous year. Our output was once more the greatest in the nation's history. In the latter part of the year, some decline in employment and output occurred, following the exceptionally rapid expansion of recent years. In a free economy, reflecting as it does the independent judgments of millions of people, growth typically moves forward unevenly. But the basic forces of growth remain unimpaired. There are solid grounds for confidence that economic growth will be resumed without an extended interruption. Moreover, the Federal Government, constantly alert to signs of weakening in any part of our economy, always stands ready, with its full power, to take any appropriate further action to promote renewed business expansion.

If our history teaches us anything, it is this lesson: So far as the economic potential of our nation is concerned, the believers in the future of America have always been the realists.

I count myself as one of this company.

Our long-range problem, then, is not the stamina of our enormous engine of production. Our problem is to make sure that we use these vast economic forces confidently and creatively, not only in direct military defense efforts, but likewise in our foreign

policy, through such activities as mutual economic aid and foreign trade.

In much the same way, we have tremendous potential resources on other nonmilitary fronts to help in countering the Soviet threat: education, science, research, and, not least, the ideas and principles by which we live. And in all these cases the task ahead is to bring these resources more sharply to bear upon the new tasks of security and peace in a swiftly changing world.

IV

There are many items in the Administration's program, of a kind frequently included in a State of the Union Message. They will be the subjects of later messages to the Congress. Today I speak only about matters bearing directly upon our security and peace.

So now I place before you an outline of action designed to focus our resources upon the two tasks of security and peace.

In this special category I list eight items requiring prompt action. They are not merely desirable. I believe they are imperative.

[1]

Defense Reorganization

The first need is to assure ourselves that military organization facilitates rather than hinders the functioning of the military establishments in maintaining the security of the nation.

Since World War II, the purpose of achieving maximum organizational efficiency in a modern defense establishment has several times occasioned action by the Congress and by the Executive.

The advent of revolutionary new devices, bringing with them the problem of over-all continental defense, creates new difficulties, reminiscent of those attending the advent of the airplane more than half a century ago.

Some of the important new weapons which technology has produced do not fit into any existing service pattern. They cut across all services, involve all services, and transcend all services at every stage from development to operation. In some instances they defy classification according to branch of service.

Unfortunately, the uncertainties resulting

from such a situation, and the jurisdictional disputes attending upon it, tend to bewilder and confuse the public and create the impression that service differences are damaging the national interest.

Now, let us by all means proudly remember that the members of the armed forces give their basic and first allegiance solely to the United States. Of that fact all of us are certain. But pride of service and mistaken zeal in promoting particular doctrine have more than once occasioned the kind of difficulty of which I have just spoken.

I am not attempting today to pass judgment on the charge of harmful service rivalries. But one thing is sure. Whatever they are, America wants them stopped.

Recently I have had under special study with the intimate association of Secretary [Neil H.] McElroy the never-ending problem of efficient organization, complicated as it is by these new weapons. Soon my conclusions will be finalized. I shall promptly take such executive action as is necessary and, in a separate message, I shall present appropriate recommendations to the Congress.

Meanwhile, without anticipating the detailed form that a reorganization should take, I can state its main lines in terms of objectives:

A major purpose of military organization is to achieve real unity in the defense establishment in all the principal features of military activity. Of all these one of the most important to our nation's security is strategic planning and direction. This work must be done under unified direction.

The defense establishment must plan for a better integration of its defensive resources, particularly with respect to the newer weapons now building and under development. These obviously require full coordination in their development, production and use. Good organization can help assure such coordination.

In recognition of the need for single control in some of our most advanced development projects, the Secretary of Defense has already decided to concentrate into one organization all anti-missile and satellite technology undertaken within the Department of Defense.

Another requirement of military organization is a clear subordination of the military services to duly constituted civilian authority. This control must be real; not merely on the surface.

Next there must be assurance that an excessive number of compartments in organization will not create costly and confusing compartments in our scientific and industrial effort.

Finally, to end interservice disputes requires clear organization and decisive central direction, supported by the unstinted cooperation of every individual in the defense establishment, civilian and military.

[2]

Accelerated Defense Effort

Now the second major action item is the acceleration of the defense effort in particular areas affected by the fast pace of scientific and technological advance.

Some of the points at which improved and increasing effort is most essential are these:

We must have sure warning in the case of any attack. The improvements of warning equipment are becoming increasingly important as we approach the period when long-range missiles will come into use.

We must protect and disperse our striking forces and increase their readiness for instant reaction. This means more base facilities and more stand-by crews.

In another way we must maintain deterrent retaliatory power. This means, among other things, stepped-up long-range missile programs; accelerated programs for other effective missile systems and, for some years, more advanced aircraft.

We must maintain freedom of the seas. This means nuclear submarines and cruisers, improved anti-submarine weapons, missile ships and the like.

We must maintain all necessary types of mobile forces to deal with local conflicts should there be need. This means further improvements in equipment, mobility, tactics and firepower.

Through increases in pay and incentive, we must maintain in the armed forces the skilled manpower modern military forces require.

We must be forward-looking in our research and development to anticipate and achieve the unimagined weapons of the future.

With these and other improvements we intend to assure that our vigilance, power and technical excellence keep abreast of any realistic threat we face.

[3]

Mutual Aid

Third: We must continue to strengthen our mutual security efforts.

Most people now realize that our programs of military and defense support are an integral part of our own defense effort. If the foundations of the free world structure were progressively allowed to crumble under the pressure of Communist imperialism, the entire house of freedom would be in danger of collapse.

As for the mutual economic assistance program, the benefit to us is threefold. First, the countries receiving this aid become bulwarks against Communist encroachments as their military defenses and economies are strengthened. Nations that are conscious of a steady improvement in their industry, education, health and standard of living are not apt to fall prey to the blandishments of Communist imperialists.

Second, these countries are helped to reach the point where mutually profitable trade can expand between them and us.

Third, the mutual confidence creates an atmosphere in which real understanding and peace can flourish.

Our economic aid effort should be made more effective.

In proposals for future economic aid, I am stressing a greater use of repayable loans, through the development loan fund, through funds generated by sale of surplus farm products, and through the Export-Import Bank.

While some increase in Government funds will probably be required, it remains our objective to encourage shifting to the use of private capital sources as rapidly as possible.

My friends, one great obstacle to the economic aid program in the past has been,

not a rational argument against it on the merits, but a catchword: "Give-away program."

The fact is that no investment we make in our own security can pay us greater dividends than necessary amounts of economic aid to friendly nations.

This is no "give-away."

Let's stick to the facts!

We cannot afford to have one of our most essential security programs shot down with a slogan!

[4]

Mutual Trade

Now fourth: Both in our national interest, and in the interest of world peace, we must have a five-year extension of the trade agreements act—with broadened authority to negotiate.

World trade supports a significant segment of American industry and agriculture. It provides employment for four and one-half million American workers. It helps supply our ever-increasing demand for raw materials. It provides the opportunity for American free enterprise to develop on a world-wide scale. It strengthens our friends and increases their desire to be friends. World trade helps to lay the groundwork for peace by making all free nations of the world stronger and more self-reliant.

America is today the world's greatest trading nation. If we use this great asset wisely to meet the expanding demands of the world, we shall not only provide future opportunities for our own business, agriculture and labor, but in the process strengthen our security posture and other prospects for a prosperous, harmonious world.

As President McKinley said, as long ago as 1901:

"Isolation is no longer possible or desirable. * * *

"The period of exclusiveness is past."

[5]

Scientific Cooperation With Our Allies

Fifth: It is highly important that the Congress enact the necessary legislation to

enable us to exchange appropriate scientific and technical information with friendly countries.

It is wasteful in the extreme for friendly Allies to consume talent and money in solving problems that their friends have already solved—all because of artificial barriers to sharing. And we cannot afford to cut ourselves off from the brilliant talents and minds of scientists in friendly countries. The task ahead will be hard enough without handcuffs of our own making.

The groundwork for this kind of cooperation has already been laid in discussions among NATO countries. Promptness in following through with legislation will be the best possible evidence of American unity of purpose in cooperating with our friends.

[6]

Education and Research

Sixth: In the area of education and research, I recommend a balanced program to improve our resources, involving an investment of about a billion dollars over a four-year period. This involves new activities by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare designed to encourage improved teaching quality and student opportunities in the interests of national security. It also provides a five-fold increase in the sums available to the National Science Foundation for its activities in stimulating and improving science education.

Scrupulous attention has been paid to maintaining local control of educational policy, to spurring the maximum amount of local efforts, and to avoiding undue stress on the physical sciences at the expense of other branches of learning.

In the field of research, I am asking for substantial increases in basic research funds, including a doubling of the funds available to the National Science Foundation for this purpose.

But Federal action can do only a part of the job. In both education and research, redoubled exertions will be necessary on the part of all Americans if we are to rise to the demands of our times. This means hard work on the part of state and local

governments, private industries, schools and colleges, private organizations and foundations, teachers, parents, and—perhaps most important of all—the student himself, with his bag of books and his homework.

With this kind of all-inclusive campaign, we can create the intellectual capital we need for the years ahead—and do all this, not as regimented pawns, but as free men and women!

[7] Spending and Saving

Seventh: To provide for this extra effort for security, we must apply stern tests of priority to other expenditures, both military and civilian.

This extra effort involves, most immediately, the need for a supplemental defense appropriation of \$1,300,000,000 for fiscal year 1958.

In the 1959 budget, increased expenditures for missiles, nuclear ships, atomic energy, research and development, science and education, a special contingency fund to deal with possible new technological discoveries, and increases in pay and incentives to obtain and retain competent manpower add to a total increase over the comparable figures in the 1957 budget of about \$4 billion.

I believe that, in spite of these necessary increases, we should strive to finance the 1959 security effort out of expected revenues. While we now believe that expected revenues and expenditures will roughly balance, our real purpose will be to achieve adequate security, but always with the utmost regard for efficiency and careful management.

This purpose will require the cooperation of Congress in making careful analysis of estimates presented; it means reducing expenditures on less essential military programs and installations, postponing some new civilian programs, transferring some to the states, and curtailing or eliminating others.

Such related matters as the national debt ceiling and tax revenues will be dealt with in later messages.

[8] Works of Peace

Now, my last call for action is not primarily addressed to the Congress and people of the United States. Rather, it is a message from the people of the United States to all other peoples, especially those of the Soviet Union.

This is the spirit of what we Americans would like to say:

"In the last analysis, there is only one solution to the grim problems that lie ahead. The world must stop the present plunge toward more and more destructive weapons of war, and turn the corner that will start our steps firmly on the path toward lasting peace.

"Our greatest hope for success lies in a universal fact: the people of the world, as people, have always wanted peace and want peace now.

"The problem, then, is to find a way of translating this universal desire into action.

"This will require more than words of peace. It requires works of peace."

Now, may I try to give you some concrete examples of the kind of works of peace that might make a beginning in the new direction?

For a start our people should learn to know each other better. Recent negotiations in Washington have provided a basis in principle for greater freedom of communication and exchange of people. I urge the Soviet Government to cooperate in turning principle into practice by prompt and tangible actions that will break down the unnatural barriers that have blocked the flow of thought and understanding between our people.

Another kind of work of peace is cooperation on projects of human welfare. For example, we now have it within our power to eradicate from the face of the earth that age-old scourge of mankind: malaria. We are embarking with other nations in an all-out five-year campaign to blot out this curse forever. We invite the Soviets to join with us in this great work of humanity.

Indeed, we would be willing to pool our efforts with the Soviets in other campaigns

against the diseases that are the common enemy of all mortals—such as cancer and heart disease.

If people can get together on such projects, is it not possible that we could then go on to a full-scale cooperative program of science for peace?

A program of science for peace might provide a means of funneling into one place the results of research from scientists everywhere and from there making it available to all parts of the world.

There is almost no limit to human betterment that could result from such cooperation. Hunger and disease could increasingly be driven from the earth. The age-old dream of a good life for all could, at long last, be translated into reality.

But of all the works of peace, none is more needed now than a real first step toward disarmament.

Last August the United Nations General Assembly, by an overwhelming vote, approved a disarmament plan that we and our Allies sincerely believed to be fair and practical. The Soviets have rejected both the plan, and the negotiating procedure set up by the United Nations. As a result, negotiation on this supremely important issue is now at a standstill.

But the world cannot afford to stand still on disarmament! We must never give up the search for a basis of agreement.

Our Allies from time to time develop differing ideas on how to proceed. We must concert these convictions among ourselves. Thereafter, any reasonable proposal that holds promise for disarmament and reduction of tension must be heard, discussed, and, if possible, negotiated.

There is one indispensable condition:

A disarmament proposal, to hold real promise, must at the minimum have one feature: reliable means to ensure compliance by all. It takes actions and demonstrated integrity on both sides to create and sustain confidence. And confidence in a genuine disarmament agreement is vital. It is vital not only to the signers of the agreement, but also to the millions of people all over the world who are weary of tensions and of armaments.

I say once more, to all peoples, that we as a nation will always go the extra mile with anyone on earth if it will bring us nearer a genuine peace.

Conclusion

These, then, are the ways in which we must funnel our energies more efficiently into the task of advancing security and peace.

These actions demand and expect two things of the American people: sacrifice, and a high degree of understanding. For sacrifice to be effective it must be intelligent. Sacrifice must be made for the right purpose and in the right place—even if that place happens to come close to home!

After all, it is no good demanding sacrifice in general terms one day, and the next day, for local reasons, opposing the elimination of some unneeded Federal facility.

It is pointless to condemn Federal spending in general, and the next moment condemn just as strongly an effort to reduce the particular Federal grant that touches one's own interest.

And it makes no sense whatever to spend additional billions on military strength to deter a potential danger, and then, by cutting aid and trade programs, let the world succumb to a present danger in economic guise.

My friends of the Congress: The world is waiting to see how wisely and decisively a free representative Government can and now will act.

I believe that this Congress possesses and will display the wisdom promptly to do its part in translating into law the actions demanded by our nation's interests. But, to make law effective, our kind of Government needs the full voluntary support of millions of Americans.

I am confident that the response of the Congress and of the American people will make this time of test a time of honor. Mankind will then see more clearly than ever that the future belongs, not to the concept of the regimented atheistic state, but to the people—the God-fearing, peace-loving people of all the world.

A CURRENT HISTORY CHRONOLOGY covering the most important events of January, 1958, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

African-Asian Solidarity Conference

January 1—The African Asian Solidarity Conference ends. Delegates agree to establish a permanent solidarity council in Cairo.

January 3—Egyptian Youssef el-Sibai is elected President of the African Asian Solidarity Council for a 2-year term.

Baghdad Pact

January 17—Meetings of Baghdad Pact organization committees open in Ankara.

January 20—Representatives of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan agree to closer ties among their custom organizations and to increased information exchanges to prevent smuggling.

January 21—The Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact nations ends a five-day conference and asks for more money from "the donor governments," i.e., from Britain and the United States.

January 27—In Ankara, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles tells the Baghdad Pact nations that the United States will supply "mobile power of great force" in the event of Communist attack.

January 28—The Baghdad Pact organization's Combined Military Planning Organization is changed to a Combined Military Planning Staff, headed by Turkish General Ekrem Akalin.

January 29—The U.S. promises to give \$10 million to help improve communications among Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and Turkey.

January 30—Dulles tells the Baghdad Pact nations that the Eisenhower Doctrine commits the United States as effectively to the Middle East as membership in the Baghdad Pact organization.

Disarmament

January 13—Dag Hammarskjold, U.N. Secretary General, receives a petition from more than 9,000 scientists in 43 states asking for an international agreement banning the testing of nuclear bombs.

January 31—In a speech at the tenth annual National Roosevelt Day dinner, Adlai Stevenson suggests that the U.N. Secretary General should select a group of private citizens from all over the world to evaluate disarmament recommendations.

NATO

January 8—The council of permanent representatives to NATO endorses a three-expert report supporting Britain in her request that "her allies" continue to help her meet the cost of maintaining British forces on the continent.

January 21—Defense ministers of France, Italy and West Germany agree to pool efforts to standardize weapons.

January 29—General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, announces that British General Sir Richard N. Gale is to succeed Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery as Deputy Supreme Commander in Europe.

France asks NATO for financial aid to maintain her armed forces in West Germany.

SEATO

January 10—It is announced by headquarters of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization that the former Premier of Thailand, Pote Sarasin, has been appointed Secretary General of SEATO.

United Nations

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

January 15—A special 3-man committee investigating the refusal of Povl Bang-Jensen to turn over a list of witnesses on the Hungarian Revolution to Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold recommends that the list be burned.

January 17—Povl Bang-Jensen, suspended U.N. political officer, says that the U.N. investigating committee made "serious errors of fact" when it reported that he mishandled secret documents about Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolution.

January 24—On the roof of the United Nations, the secret list of witnesses who testified on the Hungarian Revolution is burned.

West Europe

January 7—Foreign ministers of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg appoint directing commissions for the European Atomic Energy Community and for the European Economic Community.

January 16—The nine-member Executive Commission of the European Economic Community takes its oath of office and begins to function.

ARGENTINA

January 7—The Democratic party's presidential candidate, Dr. Hector Gonzalez Iramain, reproves the Argentine government of Provisional President Pedro Eugenio Aramburu for failing to enact an election law which would give greater representation to all political parties.

January 30—The week-old, 60,000-man bank strike ends as union leaders order their members to return to work.

BOLIVIA

January 9—Salaries and wages are frozen for another year by decree of President Hernan Siles Suazo.

Canada

January 8—Gordon Churchill, Minister of Trade and Commerce, says that Parliament will be asked for \$50 million to finance the purchase or loan of surplus wheat to be supplied to Southeast Asia in accord with the terms of the Colombo Plan.

January 16—Lester B. Pearson defeats Paul Martin to become leader of the Liberal Party, succeeding Louis St. Laurent.

January 21—Two motions of no confidence are defeated by the Diefenbaker government.

Great Britain

January 1—Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd says that Britain has sent her colonies "not far short" of £1,000,000,000, (\$2.8 billion) since the close of World War II.

January 6—Peter Thorneycroft resigns as Chancellor of the Exchequer in a conflict over government fiscal policy. Derick Heathcoat-Amory is named to succeed him. Two of Thorneycroft's associates also resign.

January 8—The three ministers who resigned on January 6 say they are not in revolt against the party.

January 17—The Commissioners of Inland Revenue estimate that about 600 Britons had incomes equivalent to \$16,800 or more after taxes in fiscal 1955-1956.

January 21—A three-man tribunal investigating the Conservative government and the Bank of England clear these agencies from charges that they improperly disclosed financial secrets.

January 23—Commons expresses confidence in the economic policies of the Conservative government.

January 30—Commons majority leader R. A. Butler says that British scientists are leading the world in the development of a controlled release of energy from thermonuclear fusion reactions.

The House of Lords gives unanimous and final approval to a bill to admit women to its sessions.

India

January 3—Published statistics on Indian-Soviet trade show that India's trade with the U.S.S.R. has increased over 15 fold since a trade agreement was signed in 1953.

January 8—Prime Minister Macmillan of Great Britain talks to Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi about easing East-West tensions.

Sheikh Abdullah, former Prime Minister of Kashmir, is released after four and a half years of detention.

January 10—U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles says that the U.S. will give financial aid to India.

Sheikh Abdullah charges that India has set up an illegal regime in Kashmir.

January 13—Sheikh Abdullah asks for a plebiscite to settle the Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir.

January 16—The U.S. reveals that it will lend India \$225 million within the next few months.

New Zealand

January 1—The new Labor government sets up import licensing controls to safeguard exchange reserves.

South Africa

January 13—Treason hearings for 95 South Africans are resumed in Johannesburg. The preparatory hearings are now in the second year.

January 17—The Parliament convenes. Prime Minister Johannes G. Strijdom is absent because of illness.

January 20—April 16 is announced as the date for the country's first general election in five years.

January 30—Ninety-five South Africans are committed for trial for treason.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Bahamas

January 12—A general strike begins because of a dispute between transportation interests and the taxi drivers union.

January 15—All major resort hotels are closed because of the continuing strike.

January 16—Henry M. Taylor, chairman of the Progressive Liberal party, says that mistreatment of the island's Negro majority is the cause of the general strike.

January 17—Negro labor leaders submit terms for ending the general strike; they ask for a new tribunal to settle the taxi strike with a chairman "who has never lived in the Bahamas" and for recognition by hotel owners of the right of their employees to form free unions.

January 30—The general strike ends. The four major hotels in Nassau remain closed to tourists; it is said they "are now faced with the question of obtaining sufficient business before they can reopen even on a limited basis."

Cyprus

January 1—Governor of Cyprus Sir Hugh Foot discusses the future of Cyprus with members of the British Cabinet in London.

January 17—Sir Hugh Foot leaves London for Cyprus.

January 18—Sponsored by the Council of Europe, a commission arrives in Nicosia to look into Greek charges that the British have violated human rights in Cyprus.

January 21—Rioters clash with British troops in Nicosia's Turkish quarter. It has been reported that new British proposals suggest self-government for Cyprus and self-determination in 10 years, with possible division of Cyprus then into Turkish and Greek sections. The Turks are said to want immediate plans for partition.

January 27—In Nicosia, Turkish Cypriotes riot while British-Turkish talks proceed in Ankara about the future of Cyprus.

Kenya

January 23—The Government announces that no native political meetings will be allowed in Nairobi until further notice. This is the third government move to prevent trouble: the Kikuyu secret society K.K.M. has been proscribed; the carrying

of big bladed knives (pangas) and other offensive weapons after dark is forbidden. The African election is scheduled for March, 1958.

Malta

January 8—Prime Minister Dom Mintoff says it will not be necessary to cut colonial ties with Britain; "as long as Britain keeps faith with her pledge of keeping intact the level of employment" no action will ever be taken.

West Indies

January 3—Lord Hailes becomes first Governor General of the West Indies. The new state, with a population of three million and an area of 7700 square miles, is a federation of ten units: Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica and Antigua.

BURMA

January 4—The tenth anniversary of Burma's independence is celebrated.

January 26—Leader of the Arkanese guerrillas, U. Seinda surrenders with 1000 of his men.

CAMBODIA

January 8—The National Assembly is dissolved by King Norodom Suramarit, who accedes to the Government's request for such action on the grounds that the Assembly has encroached "on the Government's powers."

January 11—In a speech by former Premier Prince Norodom Sihanouk, published today, it is revealed that the Prince has taken an anti-Communist stand in opposition to his former sympathy with that group. Prince Sihanouk is considered the most influential political leader in the country.

CHINA (Nationalist)

January 20—Generalissimo Chiang Kai-

shek's Kuomintang party wins a majority of the seats on Taiwan's local councils following yesterday's elections.

January 22—A record rice crop of 1,832,700 tons for 1957 is announced.

CHINA (The People's Republic)

January 6—Five Americans enter Communist China, the first to do so with State Department permission since 1950. Three of the visitors are mothers whose sons have been imprisoned by the Chinese Communist government.

January 10—Restrictions on travel are tightened once again, putting an end to "easy travel." The new rules aim at preventing the migration of rural workers.

January 12—Communist China and Yemen sign treaties of friendship and for the exchange of scientific, cultural and technical information. The Chinese agree to loan Yemen the equivalent of \$16,380,000.

January 20—The Peiping radio says 2 non-Communist Cabinet members admit they are guilty of Rightist "crimes."

January 24—Trade between Japan and Red China drops by 19 per cent over 1956.

Premier Chou refuses the appeals of the 3 American mothers to release their sons.

January 31—Mao Tse-tung, head of state, issues dismissal orders for the Communications Minister, the Food Minister and the Timber Industry Minister, non-Communist members of the Cabinet charged with betraying the constitution and losing "the people's trust."

CUBA

January 12—Three of rebel leader Fidel Castro's top lieutenants are arrested, the Government reports.

January 14—Castro's men attack the sugar port area near Manzanillo in southeast Cuba. Plantations are razed, transportation is halted and prisoners and supplies are carried off.

January 16—Rebels attack Veguita and raid the funds of the government telegraph office.

January 24—One thousand government

troops move into Manzanillo to ward off an expected rebel raid.

January 25—Constitutional guarantees are restored in 5 provinces of Cuba. Suspension of such guarantees is renewed for another 45 days in Oriente Province, beset by the rebel troops of Fidel Castro.

EGYPT

January 29—Egypt is granted a large 12-year Soviet loan; details of the agreement are not revealed.

January 31—Syrian President Shukri al-Kuwatly arrives in Cairo, reportedly to join in an announcement of the merging of Syria with Egypt. The proclamation is expected shortly.

FINLAND

January 10—Finland's government reports it is out of funds. Government reserves are low because tax revenue has not been so great as expected.

FRANCE

January 16—The National Assembly supports M. Gaillard's decision to put off veterans' and war prisoners' payments until 1959.

January 19—French authorities remove a 150-ton shipment of arms from a Yugoslav freighter brought into the Algerian port of Oran by French escort vessels. The ship was en route to Casablanca.

January 22—By a vote of 334 to 226, the National Assembly upholds French policy in North Africa and in international affairs.

January 24—Deputy Foreign Minister Maurice Faure is appointed permanent head of the French delegation to European organizations.

Yugoslavia demands that France pay for the arms that were seized from a Yugoslav freighter.

January 30—The European Payments Union, the International Monetary Fund and the United States loan France a total of \$655,250,000, to tide her over the deficit in her

foreign reserves. \$525 million of the money will be made available some time in 1958.

January 31—The Algerian Reform Bill becomes law as the National Assembly passes it on third reading, 296 to 244. The bill maintains full French sovereignty, man-for-man Muslim and non-Muslim voting equality and regional autonomy.

THE FRENCH EMPIRE

Algeria

January 9—Rebel nationalists blow up the railroad line on which the first shipment of Saharan oil to a Mediterranean port was to pass. The railroad cars carrying the crude oil were not affected by the explosion, which was set off prematurely.

January 11—The French accuse Tunisia of another act of "cobelligerence": according to French officials, a rebel band crossed from Tunisia into Algeria to attack a section of the French infantry.

French Cameroon

January 5—Two companies of infantry are dispatched to this French territory at the request of Premier Andre-Marie M'Bida because of the uprising led by the Union des Populations du Cameroun.

GERMANY (East)

January 22—Premier Otto Grotewohl supports a neutral zone in Europe.

GERMANY (West)

January 21—Chancellor Adenauer challenges the Soviet Union to talks to help ease world tension. The Chancellor opposes the recent proposal to set up a neutral buffer zone in Central Europe.

January 24—The Bundesrat files suit to sue President Theodor Heuss for violating the Constitution by signing into law a bill it had rejected.

GREECE

January 11—Greece agrees to attend a 19-nation conference, at the invitation of the Soviet Union, to promote world peace.

GUATEMALA

January 19—Elections for president and 33 of the 66 congressional seats take place.

January 20—General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes of the Rightist National Democratic Reconciliation party receives the greatest number of votes, according to almost complete returns. However, none of the 4 candidates received a majority of the votes. In such cases, the Congress must decide between the two candidates having the greatest pluralities.

January 25—A congressional commission of 15 men from each of the 4 political parties involved in the election begins the official count of the election returns.

January 29—Moderate Colonel José Luis Cruz Salazar, contending for second place in the recent elections against Leftist candidate Mario Mendez Montenegro, tells his followers in the Congress to vote for Ydigoras for president, following an agreement between Salazar and Ydigoras.

HUNGARY

January 27—Hungarian Premier Janos Kadar resigns. He keeps his party post as First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers party and takes the position in the Cabinet of Minister without Portfolio.

January 28—The National Assembly accepts First Deputy Dr. Ferenc Muennich as successor to Kadar.

ICELAND

January 27—The Independence party receives almost 52 per cent of the total vote in the municipal elections of January 26. The election results are interpreted as a sign of dissatisfaction with the national

coalition government of Progressives, Social Democrats and Communists.

INDONESIA

January 6—President Sukarno leaves for a 6-week tour of Asia and Africa.

January 9—Indonesia refuses to accept United Nations' mediation in its dispute with the Netherlands over the territory of West New Guinea.

January 31—Sjafruddin Prawiranegara is dismissed from his position as Governor of the Bank of Indonesia after he criticizes the regime.

ISRAEL

January 1—Premier David Ben-Gurion agrees to head a new government if the Cabinet will agree to stay in office until the Knesset's term ends in 1959 and to maintain collective leadership.

January 7—The Knesset accepts Ben-Gurion's 5-party coalition government. This is the same Cabinet which fell last month. The Cabinet agrees to remain in office until 1959, to assume collective responsibility, and to prevent the disclosure of government decisions.

January 13—The Government announces that \$5,550,000 will be made available to Israeli Arabs whose property has been confiscated. Arab refugees will not be affected by this plan.

January 18—Dr. Francisco Urrutia, personal representative of United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, reports some progress in negotiations with Israel and Jordan over the demilitarized zone of Mount Scopus. He says that the 2 countries agree that the 1948 agreement providing for demilitarization of Mount Scopus should be followed.

January 22—The U.N. Security Council by unanimous vote calls for greater control over the "no man's land" between Jordan and Israel. It asks Jordan and Israel to disband all military facilities in that area.

January 26—Major General Moshe Dayan retires as Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army.

ITALY

January 12—The Soviet offer to keep Italy safe from Soviet attack if it joins a neutral zone free of atomic weapons is rejected by Amintore Fanfani, Secretary General of the incumbent Christian Democratic party.

JAPAN

January 8—The Japanese government reduces taxes because of a surplus of \$121 million in its 1956 budget.

LAOS

January 13—Premier Souvanna Phouma meets with Secretary Dulles of the United States in Washington.

January 24—Prince Souphanouvong, leader of the Communist dominated Pathet Lao, now being integrated with the pro-Western government of Premier Phouma, denounces communism.

January 29—Thailand and Laos reach an agreement to eliminate the demilitarized border zone between their countries. The question of the refugees in this area is also decided.

MOROCCO

January 1—The Moroccan government abandons the Spanish peseta as an official medium of exchange in Tangier. The Moroccan franc must now always be used in both public and in official transactions.

POLAND

January 12—Travel is curbed by the Government which raises the price of a passport for travel in Europe and for crossing the Polish frontier to 5000 zlotys. The cost of travel within the Communist bloc is increased from 150 to 400 zlotys.

SPAIN

January 14—Spanish West Africa is divided into two provinces, Ifni and Spanish Sahara, each under a governor general.

January 15—It is reported by Spanish author-

ities that a major attack by the Saharan Army of Liberation has been repulsed at Edchera in Spanish Sahara. Two hundred and forty one persons are dead.

January 18—The Government announces that it has thwarted a plot to reorganize the Communist party which has long been illegal in Spain.

THAILAND

January 2—It is announced that Lieutenant General Thanom Kitkhachon has been named premier by King Phumiphol Aduldet. Prince Wan Waithayakon retains the office of Foreign Minister.

TURKEY

January 16—The Government reveals that it has exposed an army plot to overthrow the government of Premier Adnan Menderes.

January 25—Premier Menderes returns from Baghdad. It is believed that his trip was made in an effort to rally greater Iraqi support behind the meeting of the Baghdad Pact countries scheduled for next week.

THE U.S.S.R.

January 2—Marshal Konstantin K. Rokossovsky is recalled from command of the Transcaucasus Military District near the Turkish border. He is reappointed a Deputy Minister of Defense.

Prices of consumer goods are increased: automobile prices go up 25 to 50 per cent; vodka prices are raised 10 to 20 per cent.

January 3—Russian officials declare that the threat of war over Syria has passed. They admit that the transfer of Marshal Rokossovsky from his Transcaucasus post to Moscow is connected with the lessening of tension over that Middle Eastern area.

January 6—A cut of 300,000 men in Soviet forces is scheduled for this year.

January 9—The Soviet Union urges a meeting of both Eastern and Western heads of government to iron out world issues.

January 17—Moscow and Warsaw communiqués are issued to announce a recent meeting that took place secretly between

Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev and Polish Communist party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka.

January 21—The Soviet Union proposes that the Middle East be kept free of nuclear weapons and missile bases.

Twenty-one German scientists and technicians, some employed at the Soviet laboratories at Sukhumi, are permitted to return to West Germany by Moscow.

January 22—At a meeting of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, a United Nations agency, the Soviet Union offers long term aid to Asian nations. Credits for as long as 5 years are offered for the purchase of machinery and equipment.

January 25—Khrushchev, in a speech just published, expresses his willingness to discuss with the West a prohibition on the use of ICBM's as part of a general disarmament plan to outlaw atomic and hydrogen weapons, to halt tests of such weapons, and to eliminate United States global military bases.

January 31—Nikita S. Khrushchev says that he would agree to delay a summit conference, but not indefinitely.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

January 16—President Eisenhower asks Congress to revise farm legislation to lower price supports.

January 22—Government estimates reveal that farm income dropped about \$200 million in 1957.

Civil Rights

January 3—The six members of the Civil Rights Commission are sworn in.

January 11—Negro parents file a suit for an injunction to end segregation in public schools in Atlanta, Georgia.

January 12—Georgia officials say that their white public schools will never admit Negro students.

January 15—The University of South Carolina rejects eleven Negroes seeking admission.

January 20—An uncapped and unfused stick of dynamite is found in an empty locker at Central High School, Little Rock.

January 22—A Ku Klux Klansman is fined \$60 plus costs for public drunkenness and concealing a weapon, after his arrest because of provoking incitement to riot against Indians in Lumberton, North Carolina.

The Economy

January 15—The Government announces that in mid-December unemployment rose to about 3,374,000, the highest total for any December since 1949.

The Federal Reserve Board reduces margin requirements for stock transactions from 70 to 50 per cent of the price of the stock.

January 17—The Labor Department reports that in the first week of January 2,809,300 workers received unemployment compensation.

January 21—The consumer price index for December shows no increase over November. Rising food and rental prices are offset by lower prices for new automobiles and some clothing.

January 22—The Labor Department says that nearly one-third of the country's major industrial centers are areas of "substantial" unemployment.

January 30—Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell says that he expects unemployment to reach 4 to 4.5 million in February; some of this will be seasonal.

Foreign Policy

January 10—Secretary of State Dulles says that Soviet consent to German re-unification would be the "most realistic and encouraging" sign of Soviet good faith.

January 12—President Eisenhower tells Soviet Premier Bulganin that he is willing to attend a conference of heads of government if it is prepared in a way that offers

"good hope" for success in advancing peace.

January 18—The United States offers to help the International Atomic Agency: by providing the free services of 20-30 consultants, providing 120 fellowships for work in the U.S., contributing up to \$125,000 to an agency fellowship fund.

January 22—Secretary of State Dulles leaves for the Baghdad Pact conference.

January 26—Llewellyn E. Thompson Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, reports "no progress" in preparing for a top-level East-West meeting.

January 27—The United States and the U.S.S.R. reveal that they have reached an agreement to cooperate in the cultural, technical, education and sports fields.

Government

January 7—As the second session of the Eighty-fifth Congress opens, over 100 bills are introduced.

January 8—The Federal Housing Administration repeals a 1955 anti-inflation rule and adjusts the discounts permissible on F.H.A.-insured mortgages.

January 9—President Eisenhower presents his sixth State of the Union message to Congress asking for foreign economic aid and trade and a balanced defense program. (For further information see pages 174-181 of this issue).

January 13—President Eisenhower sends Congress his fifth budget calling for record spending of \$73.9 billion in fiscal year 1959.

President Eisenhower formally nominates William P. Rogers as Attorney General and sends 56 other appointments for Senate confirmation.

January 14—The Treasury asks Congress to raise the national debt ceiling temporarily from \$275 billion to \$280 billion.

January 20—The State Department reveals that the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, John M. Allison, will be transferred to another post.

The President says that "unwarranted" wage or price increases could threaten the anticipated economic recovery in 1958.

January 23—President Eisenhower nomi-

nates new ambassadors to Venezuela, Jordan, Thailand, Greece, Libya, Guatemala and Rumania.

January 24—A representative of the General Accounting Office says that the Office will examine expense vouchers of F.C.C. members accused by a staff memorandum of a House subcommittee of accepting gifts from the radio-television industry and charging the Government for the same expenses.

January 25—Three members of the F.C.C. deny that they accepted improper expense account money.

January 27—President Eisenhower sends an Education Message to Congress, asking for a four-year federal aid program totalling \$1 billion if the states contribute \$600 million.

January 30—The President asks Congress to extend reciprocal trade laws for 5 years.

January 31—The Federal Power Commission gives New York a final license for a Niagara power project.

Labor

January 3—James R. Hoffa says that current contracts of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters will continue to include "hot cargo" clauses pending a Supreme Court ruling.

January 9—Dave Beck Jr. loses an appeal for a new trial on his conviction for grand larceny.

January 13—The United Auto Workers publicize a new program including a profit-sharing plan plus higher wages for 1958.

January 14—Dave Beck Sr. is denied a new trial.

January 15—Dave Beck promises that the Teamsters Union will cooperate with other unions despite its expulsion from the A.F.L.-C.I.O.

January 23—James Hoffa becomes president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. A board of three monitors approved by the court will serve with him.

President Eisenhower offers Congress a labor program stressing protection for the rights of union members.

Meeting in special convention delegates of the United Automobile Workers adopt

a program calling for productivity wage increases and for profit sharing.

January 24—The U.A.W. plans to raise a \$50 million strike fund.

Military Policy

January 3—The Air Force reveals that it is forming two squadrons armed with intermediate range ballistic missiles.

January 4—The Chrysler Corporation is awarded \$51.8 million in contracts for ballistic missile production.

January 6—Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke says that if we "place our future in the hands of a single military national protector" we will "lay the foundations for national disaster." He opposes reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Lieutenant General James M. Gavin says that he is leaving the Army because he is "no longer being considered for promotion and assignment to a more responsible position," because of public criticisms he made of the Pentagon's missile program.

January 7—Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker publicly offers Gavin a promotion to the position of four-star general and a choice of two assignments if he does not retire.

President Eisenhower asks Congress for \$1.260 billion in new money as part of a plan to channel an extra \$1.37 billion into missiles and air defense.

January 8—Secretary of the Army Brucker "reluctantly" approves Gavin's request for retirement.

January 10—Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy reveals that the Army has been ordered to replace the liquid fuel Redstone with a solid fuel ballistic missile.

An Atlas ICBM is successfully fired at Cape Canaveral. This is the second successful Atlas firing.

January 11—The Army, Navy and Air Force chiefs oppose fundamental reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

January 14—President Eisenhower asks Congress for \$518 million for pay increases for the armed forces.

January 17—General Nathan F. Twining says that the three armed services agree on strategic war plans.

January 18—It is announced by the Defense Department that William M. Holaday, Defense Department director for guided missiles, will direct all anti-missile weapon development in the Army and Air Force.

January 26—It is announced that a second attempt to launch a satellite-bearing Vanguard rocket has been suspended because of mechanical difficulties.

January 28—An Air Force Thor is fired at Cape Canaveral in a flight that "was not completely successful."

January 31—An Army Jupiter-C rocket fires a 30 pound satellite into orbit from Cape Canaveral.

Politics

January 20—President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon address party leaders on closed circuit television, opening the 1958 congressional election campaign.

The President asks the nation to keep the security issue out of politics in 1958.

Assistant to the President Sherman Adams attacks the Democratic party for responsibility in the missile program lag in a speech at the Minnesota United Republican dinner.

January 21—The Republican-controlled New Jersey State Senate refuses to confirm the reappointment of Attorney General Grover C. Richman Jr.

Supreme Court

January 6—The Supreme Court agrees to rule on the question: whether the Secretary of State can constitutionally deny a passport to a citizen on the basis of confidential information.

January 13—The Supreme Court rules unanimously that the Interstate Commerce Commission cannot raise intrastate railroad commuter fares just because the commuter service is not paying for itself; the I.C.C. must consider all intrastate freight and passenger revenue before granting increased fares.

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